Akali groups have been talking of unity for the past few months. Akal Takhat Jathedar Prof. Manjit Singh took the initiative to promote the unity efforts. He called several of Sikh tenets, to be humble and to symbolically work in the leading Akali politicians to Amritsar and asked them, in terms community’s kitchen. The endeavor was to make Akalis realize that they were commoners rather than the rulers. There were political discussions. The result was the “Amritsar Declaration,” a new program for a new Akali outfit known as Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar). Prof Manjit Singh tried to persuade Parkash Singh Badal to join the new Akali Dal and subscribe to its thesis which calls for India’s reorganization among confederal states. The thesis fell short of Khalistan but was acceptable to a large section of Sikhs of various persuasions as a transitional phase. Badal first talked of the need for unity based on commonality of ideas but subsequently publicly rejected the Amritsar declaration. Despite a categorical rejection of the main thesis of the Akali Dal (A) by the Badal group, S.G.P.C. President Gurcharan Singh Tohra last week announced that a unity of Akali groups had been achieved and a new set-up would come into being by April 13, 1995 (Vaisakhi).

Before we analyze different aspects of Akali unity, a reflection on the background is called for. Akalis had been the main political organization of Sikhs since 1920. They fought for a Punjabi-speaking state and twice forced governments in Punjab. By the early 80’s, they had outlived their utility to Sikhs. They were increasingly marginalized by Sikh youth groups led by the late Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale – who almost completely took over the Akali political stage in 198283. The Indian state, unable to reconcile itself to the Sikh politics going out of its hands, launched a full scale aggression on the Sikh community in 1984. The brunt of this aggression was the Sikhs youths and their families. The Akalis, meanwhile, reached an accord with the Indian government known as Rajiv Longowal accord. It was signed after bypassing the youth groups, who revolted against the accord. The youth groups turned the tables on the Akalis in 1989 when they won 10 out of 13 parliamentary seats from Punjab, defeating in the process both Congress (I) and Akali candidates. Following these defeats, while the Indian state launched a renewed campaign against youths and massacred them whole-sale, the marginalized Akali groups with tongue in cheek accepted pro Khalistan youths as their political leaders. At a congregation at Anandpur Sahib in 1992, the Akali groups declared their support to Khalistan. In the meanwhile, the years 1992-94 have been the worst for Sikh youths and for those who stood for Khalistan. Through fascist methods, pro-Khalistan families were eliminated by the Indian state to pave the way for the re-emergence of Akalis on the political stage.

The efforts for “unity” were a smoke-screen by clever Akalis to modify their old pro-Khalistan stance. Induction of Akal Takhat Jathedar into the process was aimed at lending respectability to the political retraction. The Amritsar declaration itself was the result of a compromise. Recently, even this position was given up. The so-called unity achieved under the aegis of Akal Takhat Jathedar is shorn of any stance unacceptable to the Indian state. The unity is on Badal’s terms. In short, it is a “home coming” for Tohra who had fallen out with Badal sometime ago. Akali politics is back at “Square 1.” It is a pity that Jathedar of Akal Takhat, wittingly or unwittingly, allowed his position to be used by the Akalis for ulterior purposes. He is likely to realize this before long.

Luckily, the Sikh community can no longer be taken in by the Akalis for bringing back the old policy of corruption and self promotion. The community has gone through a harrowing experience. Even the Akali manoeuvres can be turned into an opportunity to reinforce new polarization based on ideology. Healthy Sikh groups can join hands to defeat the Akali games once again.

Article extracted from this publication >> March 3, 1995