It is more than seven years that a gum struggle for the survival of Sikh Panth has been going on in Punjab, but as a result of clever disinformation fed by the Indian government controlled media, the general public outside India does not fully grasp the degree of success the Sikh militants have achieved inspite of heavy odds against which they are carrying on their relentless battle, It may, therefore, be useful to analyses the factors which hamper the attainment of any major or spectacular gains by the partisans.
Insurgency operations are basically hit and run skirmishes spread over a long drawn period and invariably do no provide immediate Success in terms of material or territorial gains. The essential ingredients for successful waging of guerrilla warfare are motivation of the participants, save haven or firm base to fall back into, suitability of terrain, adequate intelligence concerning enemy reactive plans, and sympathetic attitude of the population.
It can be assumed without any reasonable doubt that these insurgents are bands of highly motivated personnel who are participating voluntarily without expecting any instant gains, and have a firm conviction in the righteousness of their cause, theirs is a protracted struggle which may not fructify during their own life time. It is a conflict against heavy odds and under the most adverse conditions. Almost any factor considered conducive to the success of such activity is missing in the plains of Punjab. With the demographic composition of the area, it can be safely presumed that almost half the population, mostly non Sikhs, is either hostile or unsympathetic towards the cause of these insurgents. Out of the remainder, there will be a sizeable proportion who can be termed as neutral or fence sitters. Therefore, to carry out any clandestine activity in the midst of a population of which 25 to 30% only can be relied upon as sympathizers or collaborators, is indeed stupendous task.
The most unhelpful factor that goes against the conduct of this unconventional warfare is the terrain as exists in the area of operations. Punjab is a flat countryside criss crossed by two major rivers and a network of irrigation canals with hardly any forested area to provide cover from air observation. Some cover in the form of broken ground does exist along the banks of Rivers Beas and Satluj, especially around their confluence at Harike (generally referred to as Mand area), and at the foothills of Hoshiarpur and Ropar districts, Crops such as surgarcane and maize (corn), that could provide cover from air and ground observation for a limited period, are not popular with the farmers due to poor remunerative return. After the harvesting season there is virtually no cover available outside the rural built-up areas to hide even small groups of men. The means of surface communication in the area are excellent with good link roads connecting villages, which enhance the mobility of the government security forces. Added to this, the third dimension in the form of aerial reconnaissance militates against the freedom of action by the insurgents. Preponderance of known hostile population in big towns also deters guerrilla operation in urban areas, which would have effectively engaged government troops in a slogging match continuously.
Under ideal conditions the guerillas would operate from a number of secure firm bases where they rest and train, and hide their weapons and locate ammunition caches. There are no such areas available where they can rest as an organized force without fear of being surprised by the enemy. Probably in the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Firozpur they could find safe haven across the unguarded portion of Indo Pak border where Pakistanis may overlook such infiltration by armed Sikhs for obvious reasons. It is common knowledge that trans-border movement by hostile elements dovetails into the respective national policy of both the neighboring countries.
In this scenario the desirable modus operandi will be almost complete decentralisation of command, leaving execution of planned actions entirely to the iniative of the lowest group, This will ensure that in case of any member of one group being taken prisoner, the security and plans of other groups is not compromised. This aim is being indirectly achieved by various liberation forces jumping into the fray and operating independent of one another and perhaps without any coordination or concerted effort. This may give an ostensible impression of lack of unity amongst the partisans but tactically it is desirable. With a number of independent forces operating in the area, counter intelligence by the government agencies and infiltration of spies into militant organisations is thwarted or rendered difficult.
Contrary to the Indian government propaganda concerning the arming and training of these freedom fighters by Pakistan, it appears the weapons are being procured by their parent organisations in the international market with funds obtained through bank holdups and supplemented by armament captured or obtained from government security troops. The main weapons the insurgents employ are pistols and carbines which can be easily carried hidden under the outer garment. AK 47 Assault Rifle appears to be popular especially in winter, when most of the people carry light woollen wrap rounds which helps to conceal he weapon, and hence facilitate he merging of the insurgents into a crowd. They are also reported to be equipped with rocket launchers. Lately, they have made effective use of booby traps, controlled detonating devices and anti-tank mines. It is likely that they do not have any anti-aircraft missile, which will deter unhindered use of air space by the government troops.-
The insurgents have a reasonable degree of flexibility and versatility in movement. Depending on the situation, time of the day and weather conditions, they go on foot, ride a horse a bike or motorized transport. They have no radio network of their own and use the existing telephone system, whenever needed. However it may not be farfetched to give them the capability of listening in on security forces radio nets to monitor their movement. There is growing evidence of their having established intelligence and espionage foothold within the government security agencies. Perhaps it is due to the active cooperation by these agents that the partisans have achieved some notable gains in the form of bomb blasts within heavily guarded police campuses. Feeding of regular intelligence information about the para military forces helps them to plan their targets and to anticipate the degree and the type of reaction by the enemy. Simultaneously, they have succeeded to a large extent in drying up government intelligence sources by eliminating suspect informers,
Counter insurgency measures by the government follow a stereotyped pattern and have not made any dent in militant activity. Such type of operations is tiresome and psychologically debilitating. The government troops lack motivation and are hesitant to move out at night, especially in winter. They tend to be tense and open fire at any suspected movement in the countryside, To camouflage their lack of success they resort to killing innocent Sikhs, already in their custody, in stage managed encounters. Their routine consists of establishing road blocks and patrolling rural areas in open vehicles, frequent combing operations in areas like Mand have proved futile. Torture of relatives, including women, of suspected militants has proved counterproductive,
The government has tried to discredit these bands of devoted fighters by highlighting crimes committed by anti-social elements and by discreetly giving them an anti-Hindu tilt by leaving tell-tale posters owning responsibility at the site of carnage. Another subterfuge is to have selected murders committed through covert action of police enrolled goons with a view.
to malign the image of the militants, or to depict inter gang hostility or intra gang infighting Through government owned electronic media like Akashvam (AIR) or Doordarshan (TV) and controlled newspapers (through doles in the form of government advertisements), efforts are constantly made to show the insurgents as common criminals. There is polarisation in the press along communal lines and generally the reporting of incidents by the so called national press is tendentious. Government media lacks credibility amongst the masses and even in villages, common man will rather depend on BBC (Urdu/Hindi Service) for accurate news coverage than listen to AIR.
To boost the sagging morale of security forces, the government has spent millions of rupees to erect barbed wire fence and flood lighting along selected sectors of the international border. Even a layman knows that obstacles are effective only when they are covered by observation and fire, At the most it 8 political gimmick.
On the other hand, the morale of the militants is high end they appear to have psychological advantage over their adversaries. The latest incidents involving derailment of a military special train and ambush of another military motor convoy bears ample testimony to their boldness and moral ascendency. Consequently, most of the vehicular traffic in the area & generally restricted to daylight hours So also is the authority of the civil administration, particularly in the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Firozpur.
It is likely that further escalation of hostilities may take place which may bring in active involvement of army troops. Depending on the directions given by their high commands, the insurgents may target army installations, such #s ammunition dumps, isolated pasts and single vehicles which may ultimately bog down the army in large scale counter insurgency Operations a scenario hardly to the liking of the government.
Article extracted from this publication >> January 11, 1991
