The operation Black Thunder II (May 9-18, 1988) and Afghanistan are a far cry from each other obstensibly the two have nothing in common. Yet the fact appears to be that the operation has a lot to do with Moscow’s plan to pull out its troops from Afghanistan.

The first indication of the working of the Government of India’s mind on Afghan-Punjab tie up came from Union Energy Minister, Vasant Sathe, known to be Rajiv Gandhi’s “think tank,” when addressing a public meeting at Hussain wala on March 23, 1988, he “warned of the crisis deepening in Punjab after settlement of the Afghan issue” (Indian Express: March 24, 1988). Mr. Sathe added that “the danger was that Pakistan would divert its forces from the Afghanistan border to the Indian border and would do the mischief to divide India with the help of its agents.” The Union Minister in this connection recalled India’s support to the creation of Bangladesh and said the Pakistan had not forgotten its loss in the east.

Mr. Sathe said Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted peace in Punjab. He took the initiative towards that direction by releasing (Bhai Jasbir Singh and other) head priests.

Rajiv’s Political Bulldozers

Elaborating, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi asserted that his government was working “in a planned way to solve the Punjab tangle” and events were shaping as envisaged. Operation Black Thunder II, he said, was not a random exercise but was a part of the “plan”. Addressing a Press conference at Delhi soon after his arrival from an eight- day tour abroad, the Prime Minister said: “If necessary, bulldozers will be pressed into service — both political and diesel-operated bulldozers to complete the Golden Temple corridor plan” (Indian Express: June 13, 1988).

“They were not heeding Rode”

 Prem Bhatia, a pro-establishment journalist of Delhi, told B.B.C. soon after the operation: “terrorists did not heed even Ragis and Rode’s. Unless irritants (terrorists) were removed, no political dialogue was possible in Punjab. The operation was aimed at removing the irritants.” The statements of Chidambaram and Bhatia put together reflected Delhi’s hope and aspiration that the operation would pave the way for a dialogue in Punjab to “resolve” the issues.

It will be of interest to recall that Indira Gandhi, too had made a similar statement soon after Operation “Blue Star“ in June 1984. She had bitterly complained by way of justification of the operation that “Sikh leaders were not talking to us.”

While this thought process, sometimes aired publicly, at other times not made known clearly, was on in Delhi, quiet preparations were being made by intelligence units of security forces at Manesar to eliminate in one go as many militants as possible

“On March 9 when Jasbir Singh Rode was anointed Akal Takht head priest, officers (of intelligence agencies) were at the pickets, watching every movement, counting heads, guns and identifying faces. Some officers stopped trimming their beards for the occasional, but vital walk inside the temple.”

“We will pick up bodies”

Sensing that a fight between militant groups within the complex was in the offing, the Punjab Police supremo J.F. Ribeiro stated on May 4, 1988 that “we would pick up the bodies and the problem will solve itself out.” He, however, regretted that the terrorists were not obeying the Jathedar (The Tribune: May 5, 1988).

While the Prime Minister declared later that the operation Black Thunder II was not a random exercise but was a part of a well thought out plan, the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee (I) President, Beant Singh, said the “border fencing” and the operation “Black Thunder II“ were a part of the plan to solve the Punjab tangle.” (Indian Express: June 15, 1988).

“Test Firing” by Security Forces The D-Day was fast approaching. The C.R.P.F. D.LG., S.S. Virk inspected fortifications of his force at noon on May 9, 1988. The Press next day reported, obviously on the Police briefing, that Virk was fired upon by militants and he suffered jaw injury. The exchange of fire continued for six hours. At least five civilians were killed, one of them opposite the Akal Takht building, as a result of “cross firing.”

The militants have their own story to tell. An insider, who preferred anonymity, told the P.H.R.O team a few days later that the provocation came not from militants but from the C.R.P.F. Virk himself took the risky initiative of pressing with force a newly-built wall being Akal Takht with a view to pull down the structure. There was altercation between Virk and a group of militants trying to see the wall intact. A C.R.P.F. bodyguard of Virk opened fire to injure one Baldev Singh, at his shoulder. This provoked the militants. The men belonging to Sakktar Singh’s group fired back injuring the D.L.G.

The report of attack on the D.I.G. spread like wild fire. The Government promulgated curfew in the wake of the incident. J.F. Ribeiro told newsmen at Chandigarh the same afternoon that “the Centre had been informed of the situation.” P. Chidambaram told the Rajya Sabha that the Centre was planning “drastic action” against the militants in Golden Temple.

The curfew continued around the complex on May 10. There was sporadic C.R.P.F. firing throughout the day. The Punjab Director General of Police, K.P.S. Gill, told newsmen that security forces had been instructed to open fire on militants at the “slightest movement” by them. “The curfew would continue indefinitely giving rise to speculation that this time security forces meant business with 70 to 80 people militants caught inside the temple complex.” (Indian Express: May 11, 1988).

Darbar Sahib is sealed

During the day 800 devotees and employees of the S.G.P.C were evacuated from the complex leaving militants inside with hefty sums of money on their heads. The C.R.P.F. ensured that the complex was completely sealed and no militant should escape as many of them did during the operation “Blue Star” in 1984.

In the evening the security forces’ firing resulted in the death of two militants inside the complex and an unspecified number of them was injured. The militants were entrenched on seven points in the complex: three on the Prasad point, one each on two towers, and one each on the Clock Tower entrance and the fortifications above it.

The Press reports said the electricity and water supply had not been cut but the insiders reported later that the Government claim was not true: the power and water supply had been cut. Bhai Surat Singh Khalsa, a Unified Akali Dal (U.A.D.) activist closely connected with Baba Joginder Singh, stated that the rooms inside had been seen to be lit by candle light when a group were allowed to go in by security forces ostensibly to pick up dead bodies.

The security forces around the complex were equipped with night vision gadgets which the militants evidently did not know with the result that when they ventured out, they were shot or injured. that top militants had been called by Bhai Jasbir Singh for a “Panthic Unity” session. The police chief when question ed said: “Several of those inside are important persons. I cannot tell you about their names for obvious reasons.” (The Tribune: May 11, 1988).

Are N.S.G. Commandos C.R.P.F. men?

“All strategic C.R.P.F. pickets overlooking the Golden Temple complex were augmented with the elite Black Cat Commandos of the National Security Guards (NSG) who were brought on May 10 even as sporadic exchange of fire between the security forces and terrorists lodged in the complex continued.

“While indefinite curfew clamped in the walled city of Amritsar since 3 p.m. on May 9 continued to be in force without any relaxation, the NSG commandos in the guise of C.R.P.F personnel kept the militants at bay with their specially brought Swedish sophisticated PSG Sniper rifles fitted with telescopic lenses and medium machine guns (MMGs) having a range of up to 1,800 metres.

“The deployment of Black Cats has been done as a part of the government’s apparent policy to exhaust out the militants trapped inside the temple more effectively. Thus, the deadly sniper rifles known for their precision have been introduced in order to eliminate the terrorists one by one….” (Indian Express: May 12, 1988).

Ill. THE FINDINGS

Ever since Surjit Singh Barnala’s dismissal as Chief Minister in May 1987 the Government of India had been following a policy in Punjab that had only one dimension: to use mindless force against militants.

The P.H.R.O investigated and produced a series of reports suggesting false encounter killings in hundreds especially in Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Faridkot, Ferozepur and Kapurthala districts. A new phenomenon in evidence during the intervening period has been the elimination of whole families including women and children. These killings have not only been disowned but also denounced by known militant groups such as Panthic Committee, Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Liberation Force and the Babbar Khalsa. Nevertheless, the media and the public opinion as a whole have been led to believe that the militant groups in Punjab were the culprits.

Summary of Findings Of Commission Headed By Justice Ajit Singh Bains:

In February 1986 The INDIAN EXPRESS published excerpts of the Bains Commission report. According to the report the commission investigated 35 cases. In all these cases according to the Police reports the accused were killed in encounters between armed Sikhs and security forces in the Punjab. Although the accused were always killed no security force persons were ever killed or injured. The commission thoroughly investigated all the 35 cases and found that all of them were fake encounters. The accused had either died in police custody due to torture during the investigation or they were killed after severe torture.

In addition to these encounter killings the commission investigated several other cases where police had registered false cases against Sikhs, particularly against the Sikh students including a case against Mr. Ranjit Singh Gill, a graduate student at Punjab Agricultural University Ludhiana, and Mr. Sukhminder Singh Sandhu, a graduate student at Government College, Ludhiana. The police charged both these students for assault on Mr. A.P. Pandey’s life. The commission found that Mr. Gill and Mr. Sandhu were falsely implicated in Mr. A.P. Pandey’s assault case. In spite of the commission’s clear findings and recommendations, the assault case against them was never withdrawn.