Simranjit Singh Mann (MP)

President Shriomani Akali Dal

14th May 1990

 

Shri Rabi Ray

Speaker Lok Sabha

New Delhi

 

Dear Mr Roy

 

I have been waiting for the last two months or so to hear from you in response to my letter of March 11, 1990. Your intriguing and inexplicable silence could perhaps mean only that you have found no legal and constitutional grounds to controvert my position in regard to the question of the wearing and carrying of kirpan inside Parliament by an elected Sikh member, a right guaranteed under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. As you know, I tried twice to enter Parliament for the Purpose of taking oath, but was prevented on each occasion by your Watch and Ward staff presumably under instruction from you. It appears to me, then, that since my position is legally unassailable, you and your advisors have thought it fit to let the matter hang. This, to my mind, is an indirect acknowledgement of your inability to challenge ny contention. Your studied silence, under the circumstances, is understandable, if not untenable.

I have made my constitutional position clear in the letter alluded to above, and in order to remove any doubts or misconceptions or apprehensions in this regard, I reiterate briefly the historical, constitutional and legal aspects of the problem.

  1. As the world knows, the consecration of the sword as an article of faith for the Sikhs has its origin in the edicts of the Tenth Master, Sri Guru Gobind Singhji. To protect its rationale and honor, the Sikhs had to fight many a battle, and launch many a morcha during the British rule. As a consequence, the right of the Sikhs to wear kirpan as part of

the profession of their religion, was accepted, and the Indian Arms Act of 1878 exempted them from its provision in relation to the kirpan. What is more significant, no limit was stipulated or prescribed regarding its size or length. The momentous judgment of a division bench of the Punjab High Court consisting of Mr Justice Smith and Mr Justice Harrison, makes this amply clear.

  1. Again the right of the Sikhs to wear and carry the kirpan was acknowledged by the Nehru Committee (1928) and the Sapru Committee (1945), para 363.

III. Under Article 25(I) of the Constitution where all persons are given the right to practice and preach their faith, there is a special explanation regarding the wearing of the kirpan by the Sikhs. Obviously, it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to leave no ambiguity in the matter. A statutory provision, therefore, left little to the will and dictates of the executive or of the judiciary as such. And since the question before Parliament relates only to the profession of Sikh religion, and not to its practice or propagation, not to permit elected Sikh members to wear the sword would amount to not only violating the spirit of the Constitution, but also, more grievously, to question the raison d’etre of the kirpan’s place in Sikh dharma.

Iv. I cite below a judgment of the Bombay High Court given by Mr Justice, M.C. Chagla and Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar in the State Vs Narsu_ Appa Mali case (ILR, Bombay, 775):

“A sharp distinction exists between religious faith and belief and religious practice. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religious practice runs counter to public order, morality or health or a policy of social welfare upon which the state has embarked then the religious practice must give way before the good of the people of the state as a whole.” This position, it may be affirmed, also was upheld by the USA Supreme Court in their own context. And the relevant lines read thus : “Laws are made for the Government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and option, they may with practices”.

  1. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the State can restrict the freedom of religion in the matter of the profession of religion, it could do so only on grounds of “public order”. And since the phrase in question is not applicable to the situation inside Parliament where responsible persons conduct their business, this provision too becomes inoperative. The entire concept of “public order” as defined in Chapter VIII of the Indian Penal Code would be vitiated if the State were to stretch the meaning to suit its own convenience or policy. I reproduce some of the laws as stated in the Statute Book :-
  2. i) IPC Section 153-A, S-505, S295 A, 298.
  3. ii) The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Post Office Act, 1898.

iii) The Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922.

  1. iv) The Official Secrets Act, 1923.
  2. v) The Security and Public Safety Acts of the various States.
  3. vi) Cinematograph Act of 1952.

vii) Section 130 of the Rep. of the People Act, 1951.

viii) The Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectional Advertisement) ,

1954.

And since all this is within your knowledge, I need argue no further the obvious and the axiomatic need no explanation. A resort, therefore to casuistry and to “specious arguments and dubious conclusions would do no honour to the August House over whose fortunes you have the privilege to preside.

And this brings me back to the issue of my entry into Parliament. I repeat, with all the emphasis at my command that since I believe in the rule of law, in the instruments of democracy, and above all, in constitutional law, I would be happy to take the required oath as member of Parliament so long as I am permitted to wear the kirpan (irrespective of its size) inside the Parliament precincts, a right that cannot be annulled or abridged at will. On my part, I assure you of my utmost cooperation in maintaining the dignity of the House to which I have the honour to belong.

 

With regards.

Yours sincerely.

Simranjit Singh Mann