The Government of India’s political approach underlying the operation Black Thunder II which, in fact, provides an unbroken thread particularly since 1982, has its own logic and consequences.
The operation “Blue Star” was considered a disaster by most politically conscious people in India although the ruling leadership and the security forces backing it remain wedded to the theory of its inevitability. The latter are, therefore, least apologetic: The operation in 1984 was conducted skil¬fully in so far as preparatory measures on political front were concerned. A great deal of propaganda against militants was
made. A section of the then Akali leadership was neutralised, if not won over, although more credence could be given to the latter possibility as the developments culminating in the Rajiv-Longowal Accord indicated. However, “mistakes”, resulting in a few thousand deaths, were committed admittedly. The operation Black Thunder I now so named, conducted through “the Parithic Government” and the S.G.P.C., on April 30, 1986, was aimed mainly at convincing the world about the fact that Mrs. Gandhi, after all, was not wrong.
Delhi learns from “Blue Star”
Far greater political and military maturity went into the preparation and conduct of the operation_ Black Thunder
As shown in the, foregoing chapters, the Government of India’s wise intelligence and propaganda agencies so managed
things that the world at large smoothly understood the inevitability of the operation certified so unwittingly, if not wittingly, by no less a person than Bhai Jasbir Singh himself, the militants’ own appointed Jathedar of Akal Takht.
The military as such was not employed in view of the damaging side-effects of operation “Blue Star” on morale of the force. Instead, a mix of military’s advanced fire power and the traditional skills of the security forces fortified by the contributions of an alert intelligence setup was used, to execute the enterprise.
The operation Black Thunder II was so designed as to result in fewer but selective deaths. It ,should at the same tune provide a maximum propaganda leverage to the Government of India vis-a-vis the militants the world over.
The Government of India did a lot of homework before the operation was undertaken. The operation nevertheless succeeded only in part. No militant leader of any consequence fell into Government hands. To that extent it could be surmised that top echelons of militants were also wiser by their experience of the operation “Blue Star” and the operation Black Thunder I.
Not that the militants had no use for gurdwaras. Sheer tradition led them to the Golden Temple not merely to take shelter but to operate militancy from there. There was little realization of the changed political situation particularly
after June 1984.
It was the British vested interest which had permitted Sikhs to use the gurdwara platform for politics. The British could have easily stopped the practice just as any hostile State would do. The alien rulers were more interested in using religion of Punjab Sikh peasantry with sizeable representation in the Army to further the cause of the empire. The British, therefore, were quite permissive about a little bit of gurdwara-based activity which, in any case, posed no threat to the empire. This also suited the rich Sikh leadership of those days. The creation of S.G.P.C. is thus the outcome of a confluence of two interests rather than the result only of the supposed Sikh struggle for
gurdwara reforms.
No more Gurdwara Based Politics
The Government of India, too, followed initially in the British footsteps. It allowed the gurdwaras to be used by Sikh politicians so long as the Sikhs were a major representational force in the Indian Army. When Sikhs were reduced to a small minority in the defence ‘services and the regional security environment became somewhat
favourable, the Government of India lost no time in resenting the use of gurdwaras for politics, especially if such politics is directed against the ruling party. The operation “Blue Star” was a clear message from Delhi. Besides, it proved politically profitable to the ruling party.
Even the politically insensitive among the militants now may have taken note of the message from Thunder II that
the days of the gurdwara-based militancy, if not the gurdwara based politics, are over. Conceptually, this kind of militancy could not be called guerilla warfare because a guerilla’s home is not known. Here thus is an opportunity for “Sikh militants” to turn “Sikh militant guerillas”. That is likely to be the
first significant fallout of the operation Black Thunder.
In that eventuality the violent movement would have spread to unknown and un assessable dimensions. It would become far more difficult to open a dialogue with any
credible Sikh group if ever Delhi thought of following such a course of action,
Any corridor plan around the Darbar Sahib complex or any other gurdwara loses relevance in the changed context.
With widespread rural unrest, a porous Indo-Pak border and growing international interest in India’s Punjab affairs, an underground, guerilla activity could do perhaps more harm to the country in the long run than what it was possible
otherwise. Is not a known devil better than an unknown angel?
Considering the recent trends in Sikh politics, restora-tion of democratic institutions without a solution to Punjab’s tangled socio-economic problems will be an uphill task. No move towards a solution is possible so, long as the Government of India, backed by security forces’ top brass, clings to the theory that Punjab’s problem is one of law and order and not of mass unrest borne out of socio-economic maladministration.
The vicious cycle in Punjab is going to stay so long as
the ruling leadership sticks to its theory of revenge and non-resolution of problems.
