Brigadier(Retd).M.S.Virk,
“The advanced countries are expected to produce self-analysis, Critical literature, The retarded countries are expected to produce literature which praises the existing Order,” says V.S.Naipul in his interview with Dileep Padgaonkar in Times of India, July 18,1993, He further adds:”
The truth behind the shameful debacle of India’s China war in 1962 lies buried deep and may never surface, despite the fact that the Henderson Brooke Committee submitted its report over 30 years back, The fact that India lost territories in every war since 1948 to her adversary, China or Paki Stan, is neither widely acknowledged nor publicized. We as a nation love to create myths and heroes sometime to cover up our failures. It serves the collusive interests of the politicians and the Services hierarchy. The myth making, however, delivers a fatal blow to the truth. General K.S.Brar writes; “I feel it is all the more important that the truth be allowed to surface because the fallout of Operation Blue Star continues to cloud the horizon over Punjab even today.” One wishes the General had indeed allowed the truth to Surface. If our past tradition is any guide, it may never surface. Instead of “The True Story,” a more apt title may have been “My Truth, Part II,” the original having been used by Indira Gandhi, for whom General Brar’s admiration is as transparent as his hatred for the “legendary Prankensicin of Sikh politics, JarnailSingh Bhindran wale” and “a pantheon of self-seeking Akali (Sikh) politicians,” the “hall mark of whose politics has been internal gangsterism.”
One wishes the veteran General had taken time off for introspection; nine years since the infamous Operation is a Jong time. It would have helped him in arriving at a more objective perspective: of the linkages involved in the rise of Saint Bhindranwale, allowing weapons into the Golden Temple, even when it had been scaled and surrounded by CRPF Units for Over a year, and the buildup of a situation wherein the use of Army could be legitimized (was there a deeper and more devious game play?), the Constitutional Akali demands, tortuous course of negotiations between the Akalis and Indira Gandhi, and how on two occasions these were aborted alter an agreement had been reached; of disinformation on Punjab which twisted the content of the problem from Constitutional to communal including the stage-managed discovery of a cow’s tail and cars in Durgiana Temple, and the cigarette butts in the Golden Temple in 1983. How come such incidents never occurred during the subsequent period when the militancy had become stronger and more active? The author glosses over the percentage of Hindus and Sikhs killed throughout the period 1982 1992 which hovers around a 20:80 ratio, He would have done greater jus tice if he had reviewed the ground reality prevailing between June 1 and June 3,1984; were all strategic consideration taken into account? Was the situation actually $0 critical as to prevent the Army from filing in the gaps in its information? Should a greater effort not have been made to ascertain in the number of extremists, weapons and their deployment? Was it in his-or the Army’s best interest to accept and “implicitly” obey “the orders given to him,” however unreasonable these may have appeared to him? Or, would it not have been advisable to study, in detail, the implications and consequences of obeying such orders in India’s larger interests, and to bring these to the notice of his superiors, or by the latter to the notice of the Chief of the Army Staff, or even the Prime Minister? Did Generals Sunderjit, R.S. Dayaland K.S.Brar produce the best plan? How was the plan executed? Was the Operation successful in resolving the Punjab problem, beyond the gory expulsion of the extremists’ corpses from the Golden Temple? Did the subsequent events in fact establish that the militants operated from Golden Temple, in which case they should have been considerably weakened after the Operation? Did the Army Headquarters anticipate the cataclysmic reaction among the Sikh officers and soldiers and warn the commanders at all levels in re mote Cantonments? In case there was no such warming, who was to blame? What are the lessons learned from the Operation, and how these could be useful to the Army in future?
An unbiased and less self-righteous approach would have allowed Brar to produce a more authentic account of the Operation. There is no evidence of the pre ceding questions having been asked or answered in the whole book. As a result General Brar’s book does not go beyond his subjective version and self-serving justification. The book has, to that extent, little historical value and fails to explode the “myths and half-truths” which he set out to do, It has possibly spawned others myths,
Brar gives no insight into the process set in motion to evolve the plan. He finds no fault with the decision taken by the Government, his superiors and himself, I won der if he has read Field Marshal Slim’s “Defeat into Victory.” He would have realized that Generals too make mistakes and must have the honesty to learn from them,
The book lacks authenticity since it is based on subjective value judgment, not on research, Thus it ignores the eyewitness accounts of correspondents, living victims and independent observers. It would have been more appropriate if either copies or extracts of Operation Orders instructions giving task, plan, and method of execution, including time schedules, is sued to and by him had been included in Appendix, This would have enabled the reader to judge the veracity of the author’s account. It is unlikely that Brar’s account would find acceptance, lacking as it does in independent corroboration. The author observes peremptorily: “Operation Blue Star was launched in order to pre serve the country’s unity and integrity,” But Brar fails to adduce any evidence to suggest how serious or immediate the threat, if any was. General Sundarji while briefing the press in 1984 had said, “I was told to flash out the extremists from the Golden Temple with no damage, if possible, to the Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) and as little as possible damage to the Akal Takhat. I was told to use bare minimum price required for achieving the object and that I was to minimize casual tics to both sides” (Quoted by Mark Tully & Satish Jacob in“ “Amritsar. Mrs.Gandhi’s Last Battle” pg.158.) The task given to Sundarji does not indicate that “the situation created by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale within the Golden Temple at Amritsar in particular, and other shrines in the state of Punjab in general, had become explosive or had assumed dangerous dimensions.” Or, in fact “the security of the country was seriously threatened” an assessment that General Brar claims formed part of his briefing. (pages 3536),
The White Paper on the Punjab Agitation says: “On June 2, Government decided to call the Army in aid of civil authorities in Punjab to check and control extremists, militants and communal violence in the state of Punjab, provide security to the people and restore normalcy.” “If Operation Blue star was designed to smash communal extremism, nothing could be a greater failure,” writes Dipankar Gupta, in “the communalizing of Punjab 19801985,” in The Economic and Political Weekly, July 13,1985.
While the Army succeeded in evicting the extremists from the Golden Temple, it reduced the Akal Takhat to nibble, fired about 300 bullets on Sri Harmandir Sahib, admittedly killed nearly 2000 persons and suffered heavier casualties than is admitted, for which Generals Sundarji, Dayal and Brar were responsible. Be sides, in the years following Operation Blue star, the number of persons killed in Punjab increased progressively till 1991 and the movement for Khalistan became stronger, even as the alienation of the Sikhs deepened. Brar fails to evaluate the success or failure of the Operation on this continuing basis, though that is the only yard stick to measure its fallout.
The plan conceived and executed for the Operation shows little generalship, since it is based on a frontal, head on assault on the vital ground, Akal Takhat, troops moving through the fields of fire. There is, apparently, a grievous failure of intelligence, for which no reasons are offered, direct assault on an objective had gone out of fashion with World War 1. General Shabeg Singh had built up an excellent reputation for unorthodox tactical planning in Indo Pak conflict of 1971 when he trained MuktiBahini, and performed with distinction. This was doubtless known to Sundayji, Dayaland Bror and should have given them a clear idea of the type of opposition they would encounter, particularly when coupled with the motivation and belief that Sant Bhindranwale and his followers were defending Harmandir Sahib. The degree of Preparation and nature and type of defenses should not have come as a surprise.
Militarily there were other options available. An assault from behind or western side, a limited commando operation, like Entebbe, coupled with the use of modem equipment, sensors, gas and so on the siege operation though considered may have had greater chance of success. I am of the view that the Army did no serious planning due probably to their overconfidence in “flushing out” the extremists. Since the latter chose to fight, the Army had no Option but to react to their action through adhoc measures, which is obvious from the fact that the iron grilled gate at the eastern entrance stopped a tank. An officer from Brar’s Headquarters’ said he was not aware of the detailed plan he now talks about!
Again, was there no likelihood of Sant Bhindranwale being persuaded to leave Harmandir Sahib to save the Akal Takhat through an emissary who could have explained the possibility of force being used by the Army, and con sequent damage?
Sant Bhindranwale’s alleged plan to rouse the rural Sikhs to march to Harmandir Sahib in thousands seems to have had an exaggerated influence on the minds of the Generals, even though they produce no evidence in its support. Sundarji, and Brar, mention this fear. One wonders why such a threat did not materialize when the Operation was in progress or soon thereafter, some villagers did make an attempt but were pre vented by the Army under Operation Wood rose, which just shows how unfounded Sundarji’s fear was. Given the quantum of Army deployed in Punjab, the terrain, easy observation and prevention of movement, and the narrow and congested city lanes, there could be no serious interference with the operation, were il to be a siege. A proper perspective of the prevailing situation would have enabled the Generals to postpone the Operation from June 3 (Guru Arjun Deyji’s martyrdom day) to a later date, Brar fails to produce any evidence of an immediate danger to the country, or of an impending march to Amritsar.
The General says he was told to “expect 1500 militants inside, of whom about 500 were really motivated.” Many Leftists, particularly in the CPI, have found words of praise for Operation Blue star, which killed hundreds of innocent pilgrims, in order to claim lives of approximately 50 militants, ‘writes Dipankar Gupta (Ibid,), [ attended a senior officers’ conference in Delhi in the last week of July 1984, which was presided over by the COAS, and included Army Commanders, selected Cos, Division and included Brigade Commanders, besides PSO’s from Army Headquarters, General Sundari told us that 492 and R6 civilians were killed and
Wounded, respectively. Lt. Gen Rhuninder Singh, then GOC in C, Central Command, asked him how many of those killed were terrorists.
Questions and Sundarji’s answers are given below;
I:”Sir, How did you determine who is 4 terrorist and who is not?” Sundarji; (losing his cool) “What the hell do you want to find out?” I:”Just the answer to the question have asked.”
S:”They were there, they got killed.”
I:”Lam afraid that does not answer my question, sir.”
- “The number of weapons recovered and the number of persons killed were about the same,”
I:”L am afraid this still does not answer my question.”
S:”What the hell could we have done? the bodies had putrefied.” I:”Sir, It may be in the Arm’s long term interest to say we do not honestly know how many of them were-terrorists.”
It is evident from the above that the Army had no idea of how many militants were inside the Golden Temple. I was also told by a journalist son of a Brigadier posted at HQ 11 Corps that a certain number of weapons were added to those actually recovered.
Now, Brar trends to minimize the number of devotees inside the Golden Temple during the Operation. “The Indians had not apparently taken into account the fact that hundreds of Sikh pilgrims had crowded into the Golden Temple courtyard to commemorate the Guru’s martyrdom..,” writes Pvanay Gupta in “Punjab Torn by Terror,” in the New York Times magazine, dated Sept.18,1985. Citizens for Democracy write in “Operation in Punjab”: Thousands of pilgrims and hundreds of Akali workers had been allowed to collect inside the Temple complex. They had been given no inkling, or warning, either of the sudden curfew or of the imminent Army attack. It was a Black Hole type of tragedy, not out of forgetfulness but out of deliberate planning and design,” Mark Tully and Satish Jacob (ibid). But Brar, predict ably, downplays the number of devotes inside the Temple and consequent loss of innocent lives.
The controversy surrounding the burning of the historic Sikh Archival Library and Tosha khana is left unresolved. Brar’s account is at variance with those of the others which suggests it was “set on fire a full two day after Blue star was officially concluded.” (Dipankar Gupta ibid). There is no mention of the treatment meted out to those who surrendered or were apprehended. It is believed 40 or so were killed while being in the custody of the local Artillery Brigade, and the others were not even provided the basic amenities available to the Prisoners of War.
Yet Brar calls the Army the “savior” who took a cleansing action.” There is no attempt to perceive the long term effect of the destruction of the Akal Takhat, and other collateral damage including bullet marks on Harmandir Sahib. The subsequent growth of the militancy and movement for Khalistan hold an obvious answer, which he ignores.
Brar lays great emphasis on how well disciplined his soldiers were. During the Indo China War of 1962 and the Indo Pak conflict in 1965, Units in some cases, retreated en-bloc from their positions and, in the latter case, some troops had returned to their launching sites, after having reached the gates of Bata shoe factory near Lahore! There have been cases of indiscipline in Indo Pak conflict 1971 involving senior officers who were alleged to have converted, for their personal use, attractive item scaptured by their commands as booty. There have been quite a few cases, in 1980 and recently, when senior officers have been asked to leave service for misdemeanor, It is unlikely that Brar’s defense of his soldiers against firing on Harmandir Sahib, given the conditions of the battle, would be generally acceptable. There were also reports of troops entering the Temple with their boots on and also of smoking in the holy premises,
Brahma Chellany, of the Associated Press, reported the shooting of Sikhs with their hands tied at the back, at a point blank range. Brar faults him for not checking his information with a responsible officer before reporting. Chellany, who claims to have concrete evidence could not have done so because his stay in Amritsar was “unauthorized.” Then there are postmortem reports to suggest that some persons were killed in custody. Army and the Central Government have shown great aversion to the foreign or Indian correspondents reporting from the scene of action by banning or expelling them, as in all Wars, and Operation Blue star.
That Operation Blue Star was badly planned, poorly executed, costly in lives to the Army and civilians, and severely damaging to the psyche of the Sikhs, and ironically, helpful to Pakistan to further its designs of using certain elements from among the Sikhs to destabilize India, if not to fracture it, is Obvious from Brar’s book, and the consequential events,
Clutching at straws, Brar justifies the assault on the Golden Temple by quoting inept precedents of the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Monte Cassino Monastery in Italy. He overlooks the fact that circumstances of attack in both cases were different from those leading to Operation Blue star. In one case the Saudi Royal family was threatened, while in the other the Monastery formed a part of the German de fences and was rightly bombed.
In final analysis, the General has lost a great opportunity of redeeming himself by writing a book which is more like His Master’s voice, One hopes nevertheless that a true account of the events pre ceding and leading to Operation Blue star, and its conduct and fall out would be published one day by those involved in its planning and conduct politicians, bureaucrats and generals, particularly Sundarji and R.S.Dayal. There may be a certain reluctance in speaking the truth, to preserve their present reputation, but like Maulana Azad they could write and leave the account to be published after a convenient lapse of time. The Sikh organizations, leaders and scholars owe it to themselves and future generations to research and produce an authentic history of the event using modem techniques of eyewitness accounts and videotapes. The Government may wish to bury the truth; it must be prevented from doing so by those who care for the truth.
General Dyer, the butcher of Jallilanwala Bagh 1919, who had been removed from his command, a few days before his death, a broken man, turned to his wife and said, “I long to meet my God, so that I may ask whether I did right or wrong in Amritsar,” One wonders whether Generals Sundarji, Dayal and Brar, as well as others who are guilty of conducting Operation Blue Star, resulting in the horrendous destruction of the holiest of the Sikh shrines and loss of innocent lives, followed by pro longed impoundment and suffering of innocent Sikhs, would have similar thoughts when they are about to meet their Creator.
Article extracted from this publication >> October 29, 1993
