WSN Service

NEW DELHI: A look back at the recent political developments clearly indicates that former Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar’s Punjab policy in effect was outlined for him by Congress (I ) although its boycott of the election was an aberration.

The main thrust of the policy was to suppress with an iron hand the militant groups to pave the way for entrusting power to an acceptable Akali group on the basis of a secret deal.

Thus the enforcement of the strategy began with the deployment of the Army in strength mainly in the three border districts Ferozepore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur under cover of routine exercises. It was well known to the army that its real task was to break the back of the militancy.

Mr. Chandra Shekhar’s omnibus call for talks with militants, according to available information, was really encouraged by the U.S. administration which had its own future Gulf war plans in mind. The U.S. aim evidently was to offer to Prime Minister Shekhar and incentive of sorts, ‘The State Department let senior Indian officers know the U.S. “position” that it was in favor of a negotiated settlement of the Punjab problem without conceding Khalistan.

 It was in pursuance of this stand that the U.S. ambassador in Delhi not Simranjit Singh Mann presumably sounded him on the US position for Sikh-Center talks. Even Pakistan reportedly was brought into the picture when the new Pakistan Prime Minister in his talks with Indian counterpart at Male summit conference sounded optimistic of settlement. No wonder Shekhar publicly spoke of internal origins of the Punjab crisis. He discounted Pakistan’s alleged interference in Punjab in so many words.

Bringing round most Sikh groups everybody at that time appeared an admirer of Prime Minister Shekhar and tended to support the proposal of talks with him. While the panthic committee headed by Dr. Sohan Singh put tough pre-conditions, these did not look insurmountable. The Government of India started talking of “even Khalistan as an agenda for the proposed talks”, Who really brought round the Panthic committee to give credence to Shekhar and his “talks”, in addition to certain foreign powers who clearly had their own ax¢ to grind, isamoot point. The only organization in Punjab which raised serious objections to the dialogue “without creating a congenial atmosphere” was Punjab Human Rights Organization. The other P.H.R.O. group, headed by Justice Ajit Singh Bains, was quietly working for the dialogue. So much so that the activities of the latter, Col Partap Singh and General Narinder Singh, publicly supported Simranjit Singh Mann on the issue.

Shekhar’s secret 90-minute meeting with Mann began on a promising note for Delhi. The Prime Minister had made it loudly clear on the eve of the talks that he was determined (0 take away more of Punjab’s river water to Haryana through the S.Y.L. canal, Mann did not object. To cancel the meeting with Shekhar on this every issue was far from Mann’s mind. But certain other positions Mann took did not suit Delhi. Generally, Mann was an uncertain quantity on certain key issues and Delhi. Preferred to deal with the more pliable, All India Sikh Students Federation headed by Bhai Manjit Singh. A channel of communication had already been opened with Manjit Singh directly as well as through Gurtej Singh.

Shekhar succeeded in certain ways far more than Congress (I). He was able to first rally traditional Alkalis round Mann to make the former relevant. Subsequently, the Prime Minister performed another feat by Splitting the Akali Dal (Mann). The breakaway groups the Badal, Longowal and the Baba groups became far more assertive than they ever were in the past. In the context of electoral politics Shekhar’s success became Congress (I)’s envy. It started rethinking about the boycott of the election.

In dealing with militants, Shekhar pushed his policy as ruthlessly as Congress (I) would like it to be. Per day killings of militants during the Shekhar rule were higher than the Congress (I) record. What is more, the then Prime Minister gave effective power in Punjab to Punjabi Hindus to make the ruthlessness even more telling. The Congress (I) government in Delhi has not changed the Governor, General OP. Malhotra, or the Punjab Chief Secretary, Tejinder Khanna, to indicate that the key Punjab appointments, in addition to the main body of Punjab policy, had by and large the approval of the Congress (I).

Reports here are that the Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister want General Malhotra to stay on in Punjab “to carry on the good work”.

Meanwhile, Gurtej Singh, convener of a “coordination committee”, which held a secret talk with Shekhar, has come out with praise of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao as well. Indication is that the Center is inclined to carry forward the Shekhar-Gurtej deal, The Prime Minister has already publicly Stated that certain proposals for Punjab (and Kashmir) are being devised. Are those being devised as part of a new deal with the A.LS.SF, (Manjit) group? The statement issued by Gurtej Singh on the one hand and the Prime Minister on the other send out a Clear pointer to the shape of things to come, Gurtej Singh and his pro-dialogue friends appear to be in too much of a hurry.

NEWS ANALYSIS

Senior Indian bureaucrats sounded by the U.S. who had their first loyalty to Congress (I) may have kept the late Rajiv Gandhi informed of the developments, The Congress (I) may have kept the late Rajiv Gandhi informed of the developments, The Congress (I) fully supported the dialogue moves although it had reservations about the pro U.S, tilt the Shekhar Government had given to the country’s Gulf policy.

The U.S. war administration maintained perfect coordination with Chandra Shekhar government on the Punjab issue. The aims of the two wars coincided. Pakistan lent a helping hand. Indian intelligence agencies did their homework well, All these forces succeeded to a large extent in.

Article extracted from this publication >> July 12, 1991