MOSCOW? The visit of the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrey, to Pakistan recently, is being presented in some circles here is part of Russia’s effort to “equalize” foreign policy relations in South Asia.

Relations with Pakistan and Iran, Kozyrey said on the eve of his visit to Islamabad, were “unjustifiably neglected” during the Soviet period. “In point of fact,” headed, “such Contacts were not existent for decades but now we are establishing a very high level of relations.” The implication scoffed at by South Asian experts and old Indian hands here is that a new Russia must not emphasize India as the bulwark of her southern foreign policy, but must pay as much attention to formerly ignored countries such as Pakistan.

“Our government is split on the very principles of its foreign policy,” said Dr. Boris Kluyev, an expert on nonproliferation and an old India watcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies here. “While president Yeltsin has said we must have the same policy with all countnes or even no policy at all, Kozyrev has sometimes said the impossible.” He added, Kozyrev and his aides are West oriented people, they don’t like the orient. They don’t understand it. They are apprehensive about it, and their concepts neither represent the interests of Russia nor the interests of the people of Russia.”

Dr. Kluyeyv was only echoing what has long been considered home truth amongst people here official Russia, for long in opposition to the West, will now bend backwards to accommodate it.

As it turned out, the visit to Pakistan which had been preceded by an earlier trip to Iran was followed up by a trip to Central Asia, to establish “a good neighborly belt” around Russia. While in Tajikistan, Kozyrey was forced to cut short his visit and rush back to Moscow lo talk to some western allies on a trip to Russia.

It is believed that Kozyrev made a big play on nuclear nonproliferation in the South Asia region, especially in the light of reports that Pakistan already had the nuclear capacity.

The visit, on the other hand, was primarily to gather a promise of sustained support and put pressure on Kabul for the release of Soviet prisoners of war still held in captivity in Afghanistan.

 

Article extracted from this publication >>  April 23, 1993