A Report in the Saudi Gazette, Jeddah Slowly but surely the initiative on the Kashmir issue is slipping out of Pakistan’s hands with India consolidating its occupation through a carrot and stick policy that clearly has Western concurrence as evidenced by British Foreign Secretary Doughlas Hurd and Perry’s refusal to criticize on even mention Indian human rights violations, while cosmetic measures like the release of Shabir Ahmad Shah or allowing a Kashmiri delegation to participate in the Casablanca OIC summit as well as the recent return of prominent Kashmiri activist Azam Inquilabi to Srinagar and his renunciation of armed struggle to achieve Kashmiri liberation are clear pointers to the shape of things to come.

What has gone wrong in Pakistan’s foreign policy that within 15 months of the PPP government’s induction into office, the country stands isolated among its friends and neighbors? What do these developments mean for Pakistan’s foreign policy in the future? What can be done to rectify the situation?

AS for Iran and China, Pakistan’s efforts to blame them for the debacle of Geneva last March did not go down too well in Tehran and Beijing, since the diplomatic debacle there, or for that matter at New York, twice within a year on Kashmir, was of Pakistan’s own making. Then the language which prominent Pakistani officials including the Prime Minister have been making regarding “fundamentalists” Benazir Bhutto even derided them as funds during an interview in London, something which even Western leaders, inimical to Islamic interests, dare not to do in public; or the foreign minister’s reference to “extremist Muslim states,” all of these are reminiscent of derogatory remarks deployed by the adversaries of Iran to describe that country.

Regarding China, the cooling in ties between Beijing and the PPP regime has been clear from day one, since even in her maiden address to the nation on October 19, 1993, Bhutto omitted any reference to relations with China, when the time came to buy the submarines, neither the Chinese offer, nor for that matter, the British offer, was even seriously considered. To top till, no federal minister belonging to the PPP was present at the Chinese national day reception on October 1, an unprecedented diplomatic snub share these setbacks in Pakistan’ foreign relations have three important repercussions. First, India is fast developing a qualitatively new level of relationship with China, since Beijing’s decision to supply uranium to India 3 is indicative of the quality, trust and depth in this newfound solidarity. Last year, the easing of tensions on the Sino Indian border resulted in India removing troops from the border resulted in India removing troops from the border with China and inducting these into Kashmir as reinforcement.

Second, India is evidently entering into a strategic relationship with another of Pakistan’s traditional friends, namely, Iran. With Iran providing a gas pipeline into India via Pakistan and Iran serving as India’s conduct into Central Asia, the linkage on both counts is of a Long term bond that is bound to strengthen and expand with the passage of time. In effect, India gets gas from Iran via Pakistan and India trades with Central Asia via Iran, It is perhaps no accident that the December 27 issue of the Iranian daily Kayhan had an editorial critical of Pakistan, regarding Pakistan’s effort …t0 host the 1997 OIC summit, in place of the agreed venue, Tehran. India’s shrewdness in appointing a Muslim, Salman Haider, as foreign secretary is likely to activate its role in the Muslim World.

Finally, on the Kashmir issue, a three stage process seems to be underway since the induction of the PPP regime, a; series of diplomatic reverses meant to convey that it is futile to internationalize the Kashmir question, Pakistan’s resoling from its traditional stand of seeking self-determination for the Kashmiris by talking as the foreign minister did, of ‘’six options’’, while the Indian position is unchanged, and pressure being borne on Pakistan, notably from the US and Britain, that it should accept a status quo solution’, a sort of South Asia “Camp David’? Which, interestingly, was first advocated by Benazir Bhutto herself.

In the last three decades, there have been three occasions demanding a revamping of Pakistani foreign policy attitudes in light of new realities. In 1963, after the Sino Indian conflict, in 1972, after the emergence of Bangladesh and now in 1995, when the country stands isolated and virtually friendless, Pakistani policy makers must realize that posturing and protocol visits can never be a substitute for policy.

Article extracted from this publication >> May 12, 1995