ISLAMABAD; Pakistan has confirmed that it has the capability to manufacture nuclear bomb but it has no intention to do so.

The admissions were made by the of state for foreign Siddque Kanju, and in a statement issued by the foreign office, Kanju told newspersons at Dubai, prior to his departure for home, that Pakistan had the capability to make a nuclear bomb but it will not do so.

The foreign office statement has attempted to set the record straight about the controversial interview given by the foreign secretary, Shahrayar Khan to the Washing: ton Post. Till these two disclosures, Pakistan has remained coy about its bomb-making ability. But since the suspension of American economic and military aid since October 1990 it has come under severe economic pressure: coupled with a shortage of vital spare pans for its US supplied military equipment.

The foreign office spokesman has regretted that the Washington Post had carried a somewhat distorted version of the foreign secretary’s recent interview, which needed to be placed in perspective. The following points made by the foreign secretary during the interview specially needed to be highlighted. Pakistan has given assurances that its nuclear program was not weapon-oriented: it will not explode a nuclear device; sensitive clear technology will not be transferred to third countries and at nuclear program was frozen at the 1989 level.

The spokesman stressed that Pakistan remained committed to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation and was willing to accept any non-discriminatory regional regime for keeping south Asia free of nuclear weapons. Pakistan had made a numuer to proposers in this regard, the latest being the prime ministers proposal of June 6,191 for a “five-nation consultation” to ensure nuclear nonproliferation in the region. With the exception of India, this proposal has been accepted by all their parties US, Russia and China

The spokesman added that through the acquisition of nuclear technology, Pakistan had acquired certain capability in the nuclear field. However, apolitical decision had been taken at the highest level to use this capability for peaceful purposes only and not to produce nuclear weapons. At the same time, for obvious security reasons. Pakistan not foregoes its options unilaterally. Pakistan had exercised restraint even though India demonstrated its nuclear-weapon capability through the explosion of a nuclear device in 1974,

The spokesman refused to be drawn not any further details about Pakistan’s exact capability in the nuclear field while reiterating that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and does not intend to make one, In consonance with its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan will not transfer sensitive nuclear technology to third countries.

The spokesman underscored that it was in the best interest of the regional countries, particularly, India and Pakistan, to devote their scarce resources for the development and progress of their respective peoples.

He expressed the hope that India, in the interest of peace and progress in the south Asia region, will respond positively to Pakistan’ proposals so that the region is saved from the specter of nuclear weapons and the regional counties can concentrate their energies on improving the quantity or life of their peoples.

NEW DELHI: The recent disclosure by Pakistan that it possessed the capability to produce at least one nuclear device makes it clear that the United States has not just failed to dissuade or prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons, but has actually contributed to Islamabad’s pursuit of nuclear arsenal, say Indian defence analysts.

Pakistan which received US aid worth billions of dollars after Soviet troops entered the n boring Afghanistan in 1979, may have used much of the American aid for a variety of military purposes including smuggling of technology from the U.S. another western  countries, raining scientists and engineers, and constructing nuclear installations they feel,

The liberal U.S. aid allowed the authorities in Islamabad to develop its weapon-oriented nuclear program notwithstanding its scarce resources. It helped it to proceed at much faster rate than otherwise would have been the case.

The suspension of the U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 could be viewed as a “much-delayed application of the U.S. eye to Islamabad’s transgressions and blatant violations of American laws,” they say.

Further, the US was mental, both directly and recently, in helping protect Pakistan’s nuclear program from the outside air attacks. Under the 1981-2 and 1987 aid packages, American military assistance, notably F-16 fighters, directly strengthened Pakistan’s armed forces and its ability to deter conventional air and land assaults.

More importantly, say analysts, the scale and the duration of the Reagan administrations 1981 aid package to Pakistan, as also its renewal on a larger scale in 1987, created an impression of “strong and durable” American ties with Pakistan.

They believe that president George Bush’s inability to certify Pakistan enabled Islamabad’s nuclear program gain a credibility by proxy,” that it otherwise could not have attained, short of a nuclear test or an official U.S. declaration (it has come now).

This non-certification had enhanced the credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear program by providing something Akin to independent confirmation that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear device,

At the same time, in not certifying Pakistan, Bush never officially declared that Pakistan possessed a nuclear device. The language of the Pressler amendment also allowed Washington and Islamabad to assert that Pakistan does not necessarily possess nuclear weapons.

All this led to Islamabad always denying that it had nuclear weapons, or that it even intends to develop such weapons. This ambiguous posture also permitted Pakistan to preserve its we aponoriented nuclear program covertly.

The analysts assert that U.S. policy towards Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions centered on raising the level of difficulty for Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons through export controls and diplomatic demarches.”

However, U.S. military and economic assistance freed the resources that Islamabad could devote towards circumventing international export controls on sensitive technologies.

Commenting on the strategies adopted by various U.S. administrations toward Pakistan the analysts say that non-proliferation Concerns were not absent from the Reagan administration’s strategy. However, some officials believed that generous military and economic assistance would dissuade Islamabad from pursuing its nuclear weapons acquisition Program.

They point out that in 1981, 1987 and 1989, Washington waived the Symington Amendment in order to continue providing aid to Pakistan.

The Symington Amendment prohibits U.S. aid to any country that receives nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment equipment, materials or technology, unless, of course, such equipment materials or technology is subject to International Atomic. Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,

Should it then be any surprise that Pak became much more over and bolder in its pursuit of much cherished nuclear bomb, the analysts say.

Article extracted from this publication >> March 6, 1992