NEW DELHI: An Army assessment had recommended a multifaceted initiative in Kashmir, which included political, social, economic and ethnic aspects, to the government, sometimes in the beginning of this year, when militancy in the valley was under check, according to informed sources.

Meanwhile, the spur in firing all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in recent months, are attempts by Pakistan to make tactical gains in order to change the LAC itself, and also wo boost the low morale of in surgen is within the Valley, While this Strategy has not affected infiltration under the cover of fire, by pinning down large Indian forces, it has helped the spread of insurgency to new areas in Southern Kashmir and Jammu division.

Sources, however, lament that both government and public Opinion failed to differentiate between law and order, terrorism, militancy and insurgency, which are precise phenomenon requiring different approaches. Insurgency implies a total support by the populace to a cause, which  self is a result of years of multidimensional states omissions and commissions. Militancy and terrorism are only two overt means of combating the state apparatus for the realization of that lost cause. There fore  with a full blown insurgency in Kashmir, only 2 Muluprong government approach can provide lasting results

With the deployment of 8 Mountain Division at Sharif Abad, on the outskirts of the valley, and another division moving in from the north, the Army concentrated throughout 1991 on militancy north and west of Srinagar. These included areas around W ular lake, like Sopore, Bandi pur, Handwara, Kupwara, Gandarbat, Baramulla and Uri. Srinagar and areas south and cast of it were largely under the Rastriya Riles and various paramilitary forces. This strategy was adopted by the Army to check militancy in the traditionally in fested areas a bettling the LAC. While militancy under the Army pressure showed signs of exhaustion on, other aspects of insurgency suffered for lack of counter-insurgency strategy on the part of both the state and Central Governments.

Ata Ume when the militant morale was low in   insurgency infested areas, the government misread the message. Instead of combatting the multi-dimensional aspects of insurgency through multifarious approach, it remained content with treating the situation as a law and order issue, to be described in terms of statistics of militant killings,

This lack of understanding of insurgency has led to the recent problem of increased terrorism in southern Kashmir and Jammu division. Under increased Army pressure in the valley, militants have moved into, till recently, peaceful areas like Khistwar, Doda and Bhadarw, south of Pirpanjal range in Jammu division.

This implies that an additional conduit zone from Jammu to the valley has been opened for militants through the Pirpangal range. Moreover, given the fact that these months the visibility on the range would be minimal as low clouds hang on the Pirpangal, the task of security forces will be increasingly difficult, With the already existing problem there are little security forces available to check vehicular traffic on the national highway. NH JA, through the Banihal pass, and NHIB, which goes to Kistwar will also become a regular militant conduit route. To contain this militancy spread from graduating into insurgency additional Army will be required.

This will be a difficult proposition, given the fact that each year to cater only for the non-escalation of insurgency Level, an avenge 10% accretion of money and forces is required.

Article extracted from this publication >> Aug 14, 1992