India is in no mood to ensure the political stability of the Sri Lankan President, Mr. Premadasa, on his own terms. In fact the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, has signaled that he catiibtafford to dance to the domestic political tunes of Mr. Premadasa.

Significantly, on the other hand, Delhi has by no means concealed its real intentions namely a desire to dictate the course of events in Sri Lanka, with particular reference to the situation in the island’s Tamil dominated North Eastern province. This sums up briefly the stalemate at the high level Indo Sri Lankan dialogue that ended here recently.

This Delhi round of talks has also thrown up a new and intriguing possibility. According to some diplomatic sources, there is speculation about India’s game plan for a Maldives type operation in Sri Lanka now.

‘IVP coup’ The scenario is as follows: By refusing to settle at the Delhi talks a timeframe for pulling out the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), Mr Gandhi has put Mr Premadasa’s political survival at risk.

In the circumstances. Mr. Premadasa could well face a military or a political coup either organized or orchestrated by the Sinhala ultranationalists, the Janata ‘Vimkti Peramuna (JVP).

Such a turn of events will then present India with a chance to step in militarily to rescue Mr. Premadasa’s elected government. Shades of the Maldives operation that India had recently undertaken when the Maldivian leader, Mr. Abdul Gayoom, was helped to survive in office,

Diplomatic speculation on these lines is of course Countered by certain arguments which point to the difficulties that India may face in executing any game plan of a Maldives type operation in Sri Lanka.

The most weighty of these arguments is the difference between the political personalities of Mr. Premadasa and Mr. Gayoom. While the latter sought assistance from India in the face of a coup attempt, Mr Premadasa, it is said, may not at all seek India’s military assistance to seek a possible coup.

 

But the school of thought that does not rule out an Indian game plan for a Maldives type operation in Sri Lanka has its supportive reasons too. These observers pose a counter question: “If there is no logic in seeking to rescue Mr. Premadasa at the very last minute, why should his political survival be put at risk at all over the IPKF issue?

 

Instead, Mr, Premadasa may himself join hands with the JVP and the coup leaders, even if it means abdicating power. In such an event, Mr, Premadasa will indeed be governed by his paramount considerations of political Opposite.

It is also asked as to what will India gain by seeking to “Indian imperialism”. So runs the argument. to “rescue” Mr. Premadasa’s elected government after first allowing it go over the brink through Delhi’s own “Intransigence” on the IPKF pullout issue,

In fact, a new military “adventurism” in Sinhala politics may put the Indian Government, and more particularly. Mr. Gandhi, in poor light in an “election year”, it is further said.

But the school of thought that does not rule out an’ Indian game plan for a Maldives type operation in Sri Lanka has its supportive reasons too. These observers pose a counter question: “If there is no logic in seeking to rescue Mr. Premadasa at the very last minute, why should his political survival be put at risk at all over the IPKF issue?

These observers point out that, in the first place. India has no business to give a political twist to the IPKF’s role by linking its withdrawal to a timeframe for the devolution of political powers to the island’s Tamils.

But , such a linkage has been established by the Indian side just to “cover up” the IPK F’s “failure” to achieve its mandate of disarming the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam and other separatist Tamil guerrilla groups. As of now, only a devolution package can perhaps be shown as the IPKF’s “gain”,

Therefore, a military “rescue” of Mr. Premadasa’s elected government may perhaps be presented as an Indian “feat” it is further said by those who foresee the “Possibility” of an Indian game plan in Sri Lanka, in the light of Delhi’s Maldivian expedition. Such speculation cannot of course be brushed aside, given Delhi’s track Record,

And, as for the failure of the Delhi round of talks, some Indian sources have said that the Sri Lankan delegation, led by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Ranjan Wijeratne, had no mandate to sign any accordin Delhi.

But the Sri Lankan has said, tongue-in-cheek, that there was of course no mandate, and certainly not to sign ‘a warrant for a prolonged presence of the IPKF.

Article extracted from this publication >>  August 18, 1989