Dr. Rajni Kothari 2nd of 2 parts courtesy of Sikh Review, Nov 1994

The behavior of the police in the riots was not all of one stream. part of it was no doubt due to the social composition of the police in Delhi most of whose lower cadres are drawn from Haryana jats who have all along been anti Sikh But part of it was also due to the increasing estrangement between civil authority and the police that has been growing in large parts of the country and over many years, resulting in mounting lack of trust in the ordinary police and increasing resort to paramilitary forces and the Army. ‘This was expressed forcefully by everyone from the Home Secretary to the then Prime Minister before the! Army ‘Action’ in Amritsar, and was repeated again in Delhi when Rajiv Gandhi is ported to have told Opposition leaders that the police was inhale of handling the situation and “we must wait for the army.” ‘Yet another clement in the situation was the known complicity in the riots of politicians at various level ,many of whom, especially at Pradhan and lower levels, have for long been in league with the police in fixing” this or that in visual or group. In short, official hostility and lack of trust al one level, official complicity at another and official incitement at yet another got combined to produce the horror of the very guardians of law and order becoming part of the reign of terror unleashed on the Sikhs. It is this combination that proved deadly, a fact that cannot be explained by any general theory of police brutality.

The complicity of the politicians ‘was partly a result of yet another aspect of the political culture left behind by Sanjay and Indira Gandhi. Most of the politicians in Delhi were “Sanjay goons,” The moment Rajiv Gandhi was swom in, they decided to go on a rampage and create such a massive “mandate” for themselves by proving themselves indispensable if the coming elections were to be won. The gambit worked, except for the “dispensable” like Dharam Dass Shahstri and Sajjan Kumar. It certainly worked in the case of H.K.L. Bhagat, that villain of the piece, and it worked in the case of Jagdish Tytler and of Lalit Maken.

Finally, we must come to terms with the most unpleasant of all aspects of the Delhi carnage. When we put together all the factors outlined above a general scenario of decay and desecration of the State, a preexisting organization and technology of terror, the carefully worked out logistics and technique, the facilitating and reinforcing conditions, and the altitude of indifference, sanction and even incitement from higher levels it still does not wholly account for the intensity, speed and brutality of the outrage. For this, one must bring in the fact of the climate of animosity and ill feeling in the majority community built overtime, getting translated into an active communal attitude. The fact of a widespread belief in this community that the Sikhs were more like enemies than friends, that they were the cause of national disintegration, that they were responsible for large scale murders of Hindus in Punjab (actually more Sikhs were killed by the extremists than Hindus), that they were an aggressive and violent people, loyal to Bhindranwale and other extremists, on the whole out to undermine Indian unity, All this got reinforced by wild rumors and press censorship. To all this must be added an economic factor: The Sikhs were among the better off and affluent strata. Even where they started off as very noor. They had prospered more than their Hindu counterparts, in the process attracting a sense of discomfort and inferiority among the latter; culturally too, they are perceived to be exploitative and dominant, cussed and ill-bred, vulgar and brutish.

These and other factors were exploited by Indira Gandhi after her. Grand shift of strategy from populist appeal to the minorities and the poor to a straight communal appeal to Hindus, especially in North India and, most malignant of all, in Delhi; this has of course grown since the killings took place in Delhi. But it was present then too. All this is by no means to say that the Hindu community in Delhi generally took part in the riots. In fact, the Sikhs have themselves vouched for the fact that they received protection from their Hindu neighbors in so many places, a fact that held back the fires of extremism from spreading in Punjab and elsewhere. While to some extent this may be due to tact and practical sense among the Sikhs (who have nothing to gain by spreading stories about their Hindu neighbors with whom they have to continue to live), there is ‘little doubt that the Hindus did come to their rescue at many places, in some cases even at the risk of inviting the wrath of rioters, or that the bulk of the killing was carried out by hoodlums and hired people under the guidance of “goonda” leaders. ‘And yet it is also the case that without a large degree of overt and covert support from the community, the miscreants could not have carried out their mission so quick lvandeosllccess fallen there is enough evidence of ordinary middle class youth engaging is looting and arson, or just looking on, or simply shutting themselves in their homes when large scale killing and burning took place, or later justifying and even exhibiting pleasure and glace at the fact that the Sikhs had been finally given their due and punished, all of which adds up to a large measure of support for the so called “riots,” from the Hindus.

Since then, a number of goonda elements in the residential colonies have been identified by a variety of investigations. Many of these are Congress (I) workers and officeholders, the role of senior politicians has also been established, and all of this goes to prove that the big Hindu backlash that had its finale in the December 1984 elections to the Lok Sabha had first raised its ugly head in Delhi and elsewhere after the assassination.

Nor did this virus leave the very top of the establishment the new Prime Minister and his immediate aides free from playing the same game. The more one thinks about it, and examines the evidence, the more it becomes clear that Rajiv Gandhi must also take the blame for the bloody revenge that took place following his mother’s assassination. He knew it, he allowed it and condoned it, and indeed he took great advantage of it. He was told this was good politics. And he accepted the advice.

It is this whole complex of factors that lay behind this “worst communal holocaust since Independence.” The fact that there is no one simple explanation, like the theory of a spontaneous communal riots, or of a single planned conspiracy hatched after the assassination, but a far more long drawn out process, does not make the anti-Sikh camage any less horrendous, If anything, it makes it worse. For it points to a more generalized incidence of brutal communal violence and widespread sanction for it over a longer period of time than is recognized by a majority of Indians, Including those living in Delhi. (Courtesy: The Sikh Review)

 

 

 

Article extracted from this publication >>  December 16, 1994