More than 30 Sikh groups met at Anandpur Saheb on Aug.11 to chalk out a common strategy to resist Indian government’s repression of Sikh youths. Initiative for the meeting ‘came from S.G.P.C. chief Baldev Singh Sibia. He was supported by former S.G.P.C. chief Gurcharan Singh Tohra, Another meeting of the representatives of the organizations was held at Anandpur Saheb on Sept. I to give a concrete shape to the projected program of action, For Sept.7 a Punjab-wide strike call was given. It was a big success. The masses responded enthusiastically. Subsequently a public rally was called at Ludhiana for Sept. 24 which was frustrated by Indian security forces. In between the Sikh masses joined the last prayer service at Fatehgarh Saheb in memory of Bhai Gurjant Singh Rajasthani who had been killed at the hands of Indian forces in a chance encounter.

The developments mentioned above were significant in many ways, the first guard Sikh leadership went on record acknowledging the supremacy of militants. They alone were entitled to hold talks with the Indian government on the future setup for Punjab. This reality was recognized by traditional Akali leaders, Despite all the brave declarations, however, a feeling among keen political observers persisted that the Alkalis had yet to mark a complete break with their past. It was felt that certain die-hard Alkalis were trying to use the anti-repression platform to stage a comeback and to regain the lost prestige and relevance. Instead of launching a genuine protest movement against Indian oppression of the Sikhs, the participants were trying to advance their careers, No wonder certain militant {groups including, for instance, the Panthic committee associated with Dr. Sohan Singh and others, expressed serious reservations about the intentions of the anti-repression crusaders. They asked the joint action committee members to resign their posts.

The militant groups are quite justified in calling into question the intentions of several leaders who participated in the Anandpur Saheb conclave. For instance, those who still ‘swear by the Rajiv-Longowals accord should have no place in the conclave. In fact, it was the first duty of the conclave to denounce in strongest possible terms the signatories as well as the contents of the accord. Instead, the conclave was in a hurry to pass a resolution that sounded pro-militant without marking a break with the Delhi-inspired accord. By doing so the participants looked far from convincing about their new political stance.

But one need not be unduly pessimistic about all the forces that joined or lent support to the conclave, Militants cannot escape their own responsibility in providing viable political leadership to the over ground movement. The task of evolving a political program and a matching strategy to implement it cannot be left to the care of the traditional Alkalis. Once the Alkalis acknowledged militant as leaders of Sikh political movement, the Onus of formulating a program and practical steps to enforce it automatically shifted to militants. It is a pity that militant shaves yet to prove equal to the “challenge” posed by traditional Akali leadership.

It is not too late for militants to provide effective leadership not merely to the under the ground but also to the over ground movement. They must come out with a document on the changing international scene with strong and immediate bearing on the situation in the Indian sub-continent. The tasks expected to be performed by the movement should be clearly spelled out. The proposed program should be viable and practical. It should be such as to cause a real hurt to the Indian state. It should be remembered that the Indian state on its part has not been harming Punjab only through the use of force. It has also been following, a multi-pronged strategy, both violent and peaceful. India’s peaceful offensive should be met peacefully just as its violent offensive should be resisted by force. The militant leadership has clearly to mark out the area of India’s peaceful aggression on Punjab so that ‘a counter strategy is evolved. It should be remembered that India’s primary concern all along has been to divert Punjab river water to Hindu states to end its (India’s) dependence ‘on Punjab in respect of primary agricultural commodities. On the other hand, it has also been Delhi’s chief concern to make Punjab dependent on India in the sphere of fuel and power. These two areas are fundamental to India’s thinking and actions vis-a-vis Punjab. Besides, it should also be clear that militant groups themselves have been clamoring for increased cultivation of sugarcane to provide them cover. This idea has great military relevance for Sikhs. But no organized, programmatic steps have been taken to translate it into practice. These suggestions are by no means exhaustive. What we would like to emphasize is that the militants must meet the political challenge in the same effective way as they met India’s challenge on the military front. The initiative taken at Anandpur Sahib ‘should be taken to its logical end.

Article extracted from this publication >> October 11, 1991