NEW DELHI: The single most important outcome of President Boris Yeltsin’s India visit, regarding defense, is that, for the first time, Moscow regards Delhi as an equal partner, rather than a client state as considered by the former Soviet Union.
This explains the offer of defense joint-ventures rather than the existing license production of equipment in India. Joint production implies equal sharing of finances, joint research, development and exports, whereas license production merits assemblage of imported components called semi knockdown (SKD) and complete knock-down (CKD) kits.
On the urgent requirement of uninterrupted supply of critical military spares there has been a father helpless suggestion that Kremlim will improve the functioning of Russian enterprises involved in spare manufacturing. A more practical suggestion was the offer of spares technology transfer and joint ventures, both of which, however, will be of limited use, depending upon their cost effectiveness on case to case basis and overall capability, of the existing indigenous defense industrial base to sustain such joint ventures.
‘Eyen as the rupee rouble parity between the two countries has been resolved, it really benefits Moscow alone by clearing an unnecessary irritant in bilateral political relation, at a time when Russia while reshaping its foreign policy can hardly appreciate down sliding relations with Delhi and the latter’s closeness to the U.S. Moreover, Moscow, at a time of acute economic deprivation, would welcome whatever it can gamer of former Soviet Union’s outstanding credit to India, With regard to the vast vanity of equipment which are in limited numbers with the defense services, it will not even be cost-effective to indigenize it. For critical equipment, cither a consortium of manufactures from Russia and elsewhere be urgently identified on mutually acceptable terms, or immediate replacements be sought for military hardware already outdated in the Russian defense forces, And such replacements can come best from Russia itself, With the ball now firmly in Delhi’s court regarding spares and product support, at least, five problems accrue for India, First, the defense industrial base is, ironically, ill prepared to optimally take on the Russian offer, Limited research and development base and funding overstaffed massive defense industrial base incapable of indigenizing a single major equipment from drawing to production stage, prevailing secrecy syndrome in the ministry precluding meaningful participation of the private sector, political Sensitivities unknown to militarily developing nations like China. Israel and Pakistan, bureaucratic functioning inimical to fast and firm decisions, defunct perspective planning and coordination within the services and an ever Urge to procure new equipment to match Pakistan, is hardly a conducive smbierence to avail the options Suggested by the Russian? President to overcome spares and related impediments to maintains assured combat sustainable capabilities of the three services.
Second, the money spent on the joint ventures, after identifying them and likely places of setting up units (this itself will be a time consuming exercise going by the present functioning in the ministry) is bound to eat into the country’s limited funds for modernization and up gradation of existing equipment. Moreover, what does the country do with the enormous variety of equipment, which though in limited numbers (for which spares are unavailable in the world, being outdated) it will not be cost-effective to indigenize them?
Third, with little existing infrastructure and experience, exports of indigenized spares and equipment is itself a commercially unviable option. In 1992, net exports of defense ministry were only Rs 102 crore, Therefore, unless the ministry opens us to learning the international arms trade means and methods and makes its product quality controls of good standards, little financial benefits would accrue from the proposed joint ventures.
Four, with no firm commitments On spares supply given by the Russian leadership, India will need to deal directly with spares manufactures, the World over, on adhoc oasis, till most of the existing former Soviet Union equipment with India gets phased out 4 And, importantly, by having gathered goodwill in the country through speedy resolution of exchange rate problems Affecting.
outstanding debts, Support on the Kashmir question, a firm commitment on transfer of Cryogenic technology required by the ISRO, offer of joint ventures for spares and equipment (which actually suits Russia more than India), President Yeltsin by publicly declaring Moscow’s interest in the race for India’s requirement for an advanced jet trainer has made a strong case of increased defense ties with India.
Article extracted from this publication >> February 5, 1993
