By Raghuvendra Tanwar
The work of the historian often puts scholars from this field of study on unpleasant and tricky paths. Andrew Robert’s criticism of British India’s last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten in his recently published book, “Eminent Churehillians” has for understandable reasons drawn national media attention, including in The Tribune, as also in Britain. One reason for this attention seems to be the harsh tone of the historian ‘(his use of the word “impeachment” for example), but also the fact that distinguished son of the British nobility with impeccable credentials has been taken to task for his role in a development that marked the end of the mighty British empire and the starting of the process that finally ended colonialism and imperialism all over the world.
I would agree with Chanchal Sarkar (Generally Speaking, August 7) that the criticism is sketchy. The fact is that Mountbatten has not yet been put under the historical microscope. There are many. Reasons for this, the most important, of course, is that his important papers are still not accessible to scholars. Besides, the period of study in question is too recent to enable an objective, detailed but unattached view of the events. Biases and passions are bound to creep in when studies of such recent events are attempted. In addition, his tragic assassination may. Also prove to be an emotionally inhibitive factor. Unsound and unacceptable it may seem, the fact is that eminent personalities who suffered a tragic end have had their errors of judgment and even misdeeds overlooked by sympathetic students of history.
Andrew Robert’s criticism of Lord Mountbatten does have historical substance. However, the blame for the communal holocaust must also be placed on leading Indian politicians of the time, particularly of the Congress, as the Viceroy is known to have rarely differed with some of these leaders. Many decisions relating to particularly Punjab defy rational explanation and will have to wait for more time for a verdict. It is only with time that passions and emotions give space to cold assessments, which in tum are often bitter to accept.
The misfortune that befell Punjab had long and complex roots. Punjab had never really been free ‘of communal passion, but the chilling scenes seen in 1947 were the result of developments peculiar to that decade. Extensive work has already been done on why the brave, chivalrous and generous people of Punjab behaved the way they did in 1947. The answer, in sum, points quite simply towards the sustained nurturing of distrust and hatred by Muslim, Hindu and Sikh fundamentalists. It is commonly believed that the flaring up ‘of communal passion was solely the result of the conscious British imperial policy. While there is a substantial element of truth in this belief this attitude, at the same time betrays signs of nationalistic. Emotionalism and, in the process, attempts to conceal the failures of political parties and the leaders in the context of Punjab. It would be grossly unfair to lay the blame for the unprecedented disaster on the shoulders of Mountbatten alone.
‘The point at which Punjab went hurtling down the road to destruction was the British government’s decision to permit a coalition government of the Congress, the Unionists and the Akalis in Punjab following the 1946 elections. This decision denied the Punjab Muslim League what it claimed to be its natural right. An analysis of the Muslim League’s policy and its highly provocative approach would require lot of space, but it would suffice to say that the league had won 73 out of the 175 seats in the Punjab Assembly the Congress. 51, the Akalis 21 and the Unionists just 19 seats.
The colonial ruler’s proposal assumes an intriguing and irrational dimension when we note that the Congress and the Unionist Party had been bitter ideological opponents all along. Unionist Party stalwarts like Sikander Hayat, Chhotu Raman initially even Khizr Hayat Tiwana was staunchly against the proposal of Pakistan and the division of Punjab. Opposing the call for the creation of Pakistan was the principle political agenda of the Unionist Party. When the Unionist Party needed to be strengthened in its fight against the Muslim League, the Congress stayed aloof on the pretext that the Unionists were collaborators in disguise. Even if we accept this view as valid, nothing had really changed in the Unionist attitude in 1946 when the Congress decided to enter into a coalition with the party and the Akalis.
When the Congress decided to join the fight against the division of Punjab the situation had already become unredeemable. With a degree of justification, the Muslim League viewed this coalition government as ‘a combination of heterogeneous elements, united merely by their hatred for the League” (Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 25, March 28, 1946).
The Congress policy in Punjab during the period shows its failure, intentionally or otherwise, to appreciate the ground realities. With the division of Punjab becoming a certainty, the Congress should have allowed the Muslim ‘League to form the government in Punjab and worked to ensure safe and coordinated transfer of population. By denying the League its rightful claim, the Congress merely precipitated a crisis.
This error of judgment and lack of foresight marked the Congress decision to join the coalition. There are indications that the Congress. Leadership was divided on the issue while Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Sardar Vallabbhai Patel were in favor, Nehru was hesitant. Once the coalition government was formed (March 6, 1946) and assumed charge (March 11) madness had already begun. On March 7 the League observed a strike and March 11 was declared “traitors day.”
Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, was an able administrator, conscious and alert to ground realities, as revealed in his numerous noting to the Viceroy. “Communalism and political tension is increasing… communities are preparing for rioting… private armies…” he wrote on May 2, 1946, (Transfer of Power Vol. VII, p. 400). Governor Jenkins told the Viceroy that the Punjab coalition Ministry lacked understanding, was divided and practically unworkable, (Transfer of power Vol. VID). Khizr Hayat, the Premier was addressed as “Gaddar Hayat” (Traitor Hayat) even in the Assembly (Punjab Legislative Assembly debate P.L, A.D. Vol. 25, March 28). The Premier fearing assassination had to frequently change his residence (Penderal Moon).
Even leaders like Firoz Khan Noon were making statements such as “… will put to shame the deeds of Haluka Khan and Chingez. (Ghengis) Khan…” (Allah Baksh, “Punjab Crisis and Cure”), if the British did not undo the injustice of dyeing to the Muslim League its claim of forming the government. The impending doom was visible in the darkening sky of Punjab and was there for everyone to see. When the holocaust finally struck, Mountbatten showed inexplicable hurry to leave India and hand over Pakistan to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and India to Jawahar Lal Nehru.
‘The advancing of the transfer of power by almost a year proved a disastrous decision, since it was the most important cause for the massive loss of life and property witnessed in different parts in India, specially Punjab. The far reaching implications of this decision have made it an unasked question of the period. ‘The full truth would emerge only from Mountbatten’s private papers.
The fault of Mountbatten, {or which history is likely to hold him responsible, is not merely an error of judgments UT the conscious evasion of tackling an emerging crisis by handing over the administration at the fateful moment to leaders who had no experience in managing such a situation. Besides, there are other issues, some ‘emotional and others practical, for which scholars will perhaps criticize him, For example, a nation that had been united for thousands of years was to be divided into two within 40 days. Millions of families were forced to find new homes ovemight, with no security or assistance. All put together, Punjab was in a state of medieval anarchy. It is estimated that at least a million people lost their lives in those traumatic months, even though Mountbatten said. “Only 1,00,0007 people died.
While India and Pakistan celebrated freedom, in millions of homes on both sides of the border the people experiericed the saddest period of their lives. It is one thing to die fighting for freedom and for a cause, but quite another to die or be ruined after being reduced to be a pawn in apolitical game. Surely the blame must rest somewhere. Even though it is too early to say how much of what fault that of Mountbatten is, he can. Never be absolved of it totally.
Article extracted from this publication >> November 25, 1994
