The relationship between Canada and India, which has undergone a significant evolution, is once more poised to embark on a new direction. First characterized by cooperation in the Commonwealth in the postwar era, then common middle power perceptions during the cold war, bilateral ties became estranged over peace- keeping and nuclear issues, and eventually were renewed because of matters like immigration and terrorism.. While political contacts are receding they have been replaced by an emphasis on economic tics. Canada’s involvement with India dates to World! War II.

Given its sensitivity to communal matters because of the situation of its French-speaking minority, Canada. was concerned that there might be t global implications to the partition of the India subcontinent.

Accordingly, Ottawa attempted to mediate the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir in 1948. The presence of its United Nations peacekeeping contingent there has involved Canada in the affairs of the subcontinent for more than four decades.

India, which has received more than $2 billion in direct aid, has been the largest recipient of Canadian external assistance. It was in the Common- wealth of Nations where Canadian and Indian ties were forged during the 1950s.

Serving as a bridge between the 28- established western democracies and the successor states of the British Empire, Canada made common cause with India on such issues as opposition to South Africa’s policy of apartheid.

Participation in the Commonwealth reflected Ottawa’s belief that international organizations reduced tensions in a bipolar world and provided a forum where Canada would not be overshadowed by its North American ally.

Besides enabling Canada to have a counterweight to its close ties to the United States, the Commonwealth link also gave Ottawa access to non- aligned thinking.

As a consequence, Canadians accepted the decision of the newly independent countries like India to opt for nonalignment sooner than Americans. Canada was sympathetic to the American objective of deterring the Soviets but skeptical that military assistance to Pakistan would upset the regional balance of power with India. This concern with the regional implications of western security assistance distinguished the world view found in Ottawa from that of Washington.

Unlike the Americans, the Canadians were not suspicious of then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s social- ism.

In the early years after Indian independence, when Escott Reid was high commissioner, there was a fundamental convergence in the approach to world affairs taken by Ottawa and New Delhi.

As middle powers they shared common views on the need to enhance relations between Asia and the west, promote multilateral organizations, foster third world development and settle military conflicts in Korea, Indochina and Suez…

While the scope of their influence was different Canada acted within the western alliance, while India’s domain was the third world both countries viewed their function as establishing links between hostile camps.

India’s task was to temper China and build a bridge between Beijing and the west, while Canada’s role was to moderate American policy towards Asia and Indian attitudes toward the United States.

The common denominators of Canadian-Indian relations were not -strong enough to survive the intrusion =of cast-west issues or Ottawa’s desire to have good relations with Pakistan which had opted for membership in America’s alliance system.

A lack of congruency surfaced over issues like Korea, Indochina and Hungary, transforming a special relation- ship into one characterized by am- bivalence.

Ironically, Canadian interest in South Asia declined in the 1970s just as the region grew in strategic importance because of the Persian Gulf and Afghan conflicts. During the administration of Pierre Trudeau, when Africa rather than South Asia became the focus of Canadian aid efforts, the relationship deteriorated further.

The indignation felt by Canadians at the Indian detonation of an atomic device produced with Canadian nuclear materials in May. 1974, marked an obvious low point in relations. It took the bombing of an Air India plane in 1985, with consider- able loss of Canadian life, to once more focus Ottawa’s attention on South Asia.

That the Canadian government again took notice of the subcontinent is reflective of the fact that relations with India, because of the high volume of immigration from that country, have become an important domestic issue. Nevertheless, the interest in containing terrorism that led to the signing of a bilateral extradition treaty in 1987 does not constitute a new special relationship.

In reality, the decline of Canadian Indian relations had more to do with a lack of identity on issues than the passing of decision-makers like Nehru and Lester Pearson who had been responsible for establishing close ties. It is apparent that neither Canada nor India can play the international role they did in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rapprochement between the United States and India, the necessity for Canada to serve as a bridge in regional matters is unlikely to be repeated.

Because of a divergence on matters like human rights and nuclear proliferation, any significant political co- operation between Ottawa and New Delhi seems unlikely and of little regional or international consequence. Canada’s capacity for independent influence in South Asia is clearly marginal. The ability of Ottawa to finance its political objectives in South Asia during a time of budgetary restraint is now under challenge. More- over, Canada’s distinctive identity has been blurred in India because of Ottawa’s participation in NAFTA and the free trade agreement with the United States.

Given its political limitations, Canada’s focus has shifted to the economic sphere. India’s economic liberalization underway since 1991, is already having an effect on relations between Ottawa and Delhi, Bilateral trade increased from $500 to more than $800 million within a year.

Half of a growing number of economic joint ventures have taken place within the last three years. More significantly, the focus of bilateral ties is shifting from aid to partnership as 17 nongovernment organizations have relationships with 250 Indian counter- parts

Canada is competing with other governments to establish their economic influence in India. Various American delegations headed by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary and Defense Secretary William Perry have recently been in India As a result Roy MacLaren, the minister who is responsible for Canada’s foreign trade and who visited India last fall is about to return again.

However, continued improvement is dependent upon a stable political climate in India. Potential investors are concerned that the ruling Congress Party’s recent election reverses in several states and the forthcoming general elections might signal a re- treat from India’s new economic pro- gram, as happened under Rajiv Gandhi in the mid-1980s.

However, the defeat of incumbent state governments of all political per- suasions on local issues like corruption is the continuation of an electoral pattern that has been going on for more than a decade, not a repudiation of Delhi’s economic reforms. While policy directions in any country are seldom linear, it is my view that India’s change of course is irreversible.

It is significant that while CPI-M Janata Dal and BJP spokespersons at the Center have criticized Finance Minister Manmohan Singh for failing to provide benefits to the masses, the state governments their parties control are competing with each other to. Entice foreign investors.

Consequently, Canadians and Indians should ignore election rhetoric and recognize that it is in their mutual interest to expand their growing commercial relationship.

By: Arthur G. Rubin off, associate professor, political science, University of Toronto.

Article extracted from this publication >> March 31, 1995