CHANDIGARH: Far too many important Sikh militant died in the past few weeks giving a serious setback to the Khalistan movement. It was indeed a glorious period for the Indian state whose representatives for once were confident of suppressing the Sikh struggle in the next few months. A few over-enthusiasts like Punjab police chief K.P.S.Gill even predicted that the militancy would come to an end by September. While India’s assessment of the Punjab problem may be far-fetched, it could not at the same time be denied that the anti-Indian activity of the Sikh guerillas perceptibly slowed down since April. Guerillas mobility stood greatly checked. On an average more than a dozen guerillas are being killed daily by the Indian state.
Among the more important militant leaders killed during the past few weeks were Bhai Amrik Singh Kauli, Bhai Chhandran, Bhai Devinder Singh Paut, Bhai Jagir Singh Bhagi bandar, Bhai Harpinder Singh Goldi, Bhai Kabul Singh Hirdewal, Bhai Dharm Singh Dhilwan, Bhai Sukhminder Singh Fauji and Bhai Jaswinder Singh Latala.
It is not material that some of the guerillas killed recently were first captured and then killed in fake encounters. A few guerillas may even still be in the custody of the police although they have been shown as killed. Such tactics are not unusual for the Indian state because it uses the captured guerillas to extort vital information to know the billing places of others. Some of the captured guerillas are also used as “black cats” for the purpose of recognizing militants or knowing their links and harborers.
What is important is the how and why of the Indian state’s success. It is quite likely that some of the militant groups have been infiltrated by the Indian intelligence. At this rate any more leading figures of the Sikh struggle may fall into the Indian state. The question is whether the Sikh guerillas can keep the Indian state at an arm’s length. They perhaps cannot unless there are drastic changes in the guerilla organization, tactics and even strategy, according to senior Sikh leaders here.
Some of the Sikh militants chose the easier way of operating, finally falling into the hands of the Indian state. They struck private accords with local Congress (I) workers to use them as safe harborers, When the occasion came, these Congress(I) workers betrayed the confidence for personal gains. In not a few cases, the militants came to an understanding with the local police which, however, kept tabs on their contact men. This information was used by the state police when a few commando groups in plain clothes were not on the militants recently. Another factor responsible for the success of the Indian state was the manner in which some of the militants operated in large groups at night. It was not much difficult for the security forces to keep track of these groups. What proved even more disastrous for militants was their practice Lo issue press notes leaking out vital information about the “participants” in secret meetings of a large number of them. Such meetings may not be reality. But the police become aware of the militants owing allegiance to different groups. Even when one guerilla is captured, he is compelled to give information about his entire group. Most Sikh militants make no distinction between the guerilla nature of their struggle and the military confrontation. That is perhaps why they operate in large groups forgetting the principle that smaller the group, more effective their fight. In addition, almost all the militant groups and their constituents draw heavily on the traditional Akali parliamentary politics of projecting personalities, The practice of issuing press notes and seeing their names in print is much too big an allurement to be resisted by the militants. This necessarily requires a large number of contact men who must get in touch with the media hostile as well as friendly regularly to reveal their routes to the Indian intelligence. It is well known that Punjab’s topography and the strength of the militant politics at present do not permit successful abduction of important men for long. The militant groups lost heavily in the wake of the Radu abduction but learnt no lesson from the misadventure. The B.K.I, men repeated the mistake by abducting All India Radio’s Manchanda and set strange terms for his release, namely that the Indian electronic media make greater use of Punjabi language in respect of its programs meant for Punjab. Certain mediators were pressed into service. They were necessarily shadowed by intelligence men who took no time to locate the approximate region where the important militant like Bhai Amrik Singh Kauli was hiding. Almost daily press notes further confirmed the hiding region of the B.F.L activist who was finally arrested with disastrous consequences for the future of the B.K.I. The ground reality in Punjab is that a large number of middle rung activists have been killed. However, the top-most political leaderships of all major groups remain intact. A vast number of local-level operatives are also functional. It will take some time for militant leaders to re-rail the political movement which saw big success first in the boycott of the February election and then the en masse resignations by elected village leaders. No wonder, the politically important activity, other than the resignations by panches and sarpanches set in motion long ago, has come to a near halt while low-level, politically unimportant killings continue.
Article extracted from this publication >> July 17, 1992
