NEW DELHEL .Gen.N.P.S BAL recently sacked by Indian authorities was the victim of communalism that has seriously infected country’s bodypolitc. Lt. Gen BAL who was director general Rashtriya rifles was dismissed from service on January 25 under section 18 of Army Act which empowers the government to sack an army officer without assigning any reason. The reason why BAL was removed was the intrigues by one Major Gen Vinod Saigal who is the son-in-law of a former Indian defence secretary H.C.Sarin, Saigal first raked up the allegation that Lt Gen BAL was “pro Sikh.” The senior army officers consequently looked into all confidential reports awarded by Lt-Gen Bal to his juniors. It was discovered that Lt Gen BAL given good reports to two senior non Sikh officers namely Maj Gen S.Sondhi and Maj GenI.K.Behl, he had awarded bad reports to two others who happened to be Sikhs namely Maj Gen Kulwant Singh and Brigadier Daullat Malkiat Singh. The charge obviously fell flat then Gen Bal faced a sense of charges of financial irregularities. At least six courts of enquiry exonerated Gen Bal of the charges. Even then Lt Gen BAL received the sack order from the government. Major Gen Vinod Saigal who received a series of adverse reports in the past few years for his performance has not only not been removed from service but is said to be poised for promotion. He is now commanding the 24 division, under headquarters 10 Corps in the west. His superiors detected four serious service flaws by Maj Gen Saigal but despite this he is going strong.

The dismissal of Lt Gen N.P.S.Bal is clearly not a case of corruption. This is evident from the weak show cause notice issued to Lt Gen BAL by the Army headquarters.

Lt Gen BAL is the second senior officer, in recent times, to have been dismissed by the Government, the other being Lt Gen J.M.Singh (incidentally Lt Gen BAL’s predecessor in 33 corps).

Charges against BAL:

Though armed with sweeping powers, the Army headquarters issued a rather weak show cause notice to Lt-Gen Bal on October 16, 1992, which was not even taken to its logical end of recording severe displeasure of the Army chief. The four issues Raised in the show cause notice are, “haste and favoritism” in allotment of a shop to a civilian contractor in 33 Corps shopping complex and misuse of manpower, army transport and cash transaction above Rs 20,000 for purchase of personnel furniture from Calcutta.

The other two issues were “lack of firmness” and “inability to accommodate views different from your own and repeated interference in the exercise of command of your subordinates. “Both relate to the differences Lt Gen BAL, as GOC 33 Corps, had with his subordinate Maj Gen Vinod Saighal, GOC 27 mountain division Lt Gen BAL refuted the charges with considerable ease, providing documentary evidence that allotment of the petty civilian shop was done after eight months of deliberations by his staff. This clearly was not a case of haste as alleged. The problem, therefore, was big and lay elsewhere. It was an allegedly near total breakdown of the command structure of 33 Corps under Lt-Gen Bal, especially after Maj Gen Saighal took over the command of 27 divisions on March 17, 1991. At least half a dozen court of equines were ordered, with an unprecedented master court of inquiry ever done by the Vice Chief of Army Staff to go into Corps problems, which was submitted to the Army headquarters in October 1991. Both generals were posted out, with Lt Gen BAL taking over as Director-general Rastriya Rifles on October 2, 1991.

19 Sikh Battalion affairs: Heat was generated in 33 Corps in the affairs of 19 Sikh battalion of which Lt Gen BAL was the colonel of the regiment. The problem was that while 27 division, being in the chain of command, should not have been bypassed by the unit to approach the corps headquarters, Lt Gen Bal as both Corps commander and colonel of the regiment wore two hats and was justified in directly keeping the abreast of the unit’s activities. And how much should he have been involved in the affairs of this particular unites a debatable point.

In March 1991, Major V.K.Khullar of 19 Sikh was roughed up by a jawan, who had been denied leave. The jawan was dismissed from service and the officer sought refuge in the hospital for an old ailment. Major G.C.Angiras of the same unit was also manhandled by another jawan in June 1991. The jawan was given two years imprisonment and the officer sought change of arm. Another officer, Major B.K.Mehta was found to be an alcoholic during Lt Gen BAL’s visit to the unit, and his medical category was downgraded. Three jawans were allegedly involved in terrorist activities. When the unit had come to its present location after a dismal record in the previous station the commanding officer was replaced, on Lt Gen BAL’s recommendation, as he was found compromising on important issues. Notwithstanding, all this, GOC 27 division never once visited this unit, which was under his direct command.

Courts of Inquiry: The other court of inquiries concerned the canteen accounts of 123 mountain brigade, controversies over illegal selling of coal dust and various other serious issues in the corps zone, The main reason being that generals Bal and Saighal developed mutual dislike within days of Maj Gen Saighal taking over 27 division, with the latter not once personally calling on his superior, who in turn communicated with GOC 27 division only through his staff. Within 17 days of joining, Maj Gen Saighal through a confidential signal sent to superior headquarters, challenged the army headquarters approved new operational “strategy for the 1990s and dual tasking” for the eastern sector. For this, he was given two written admonitions in the shape of‘ ‘personnel counseling’s” by the then Army Commander Lt Gen K.S.Brar, One of these recorded that Saighal “continued to bypass channels, showing total disregard for chain of command and displayed scant regard for official procedures, customs, norms and ethics of service.”

What followed were charges and countercharges between the two generals. For instance, Headquarters 33 corps ran exercises for brigades of 27 divisions, without prior knowledge of GOC 27 division. GOC 27 division started corresponding directly with army headquarters without knowledge of the Corps had quarters.

Article extracted from this publication >>  February 26, 1993