In their confrontation with Delhi, neither Akalis nor Militants have been able to play the game with a degree of professionalism required to outmaneuver the opponent. At no point they seem to have acted independently. So far, each of their moves has been nothing but a predictable answer to the designs of Delhi. By successfully projecting Akalis as its accomplices in the Operation Bluestar, Delhi was able to destroy their credibility with the Sikh masses. It was done to improve the electoral prospects of the Congress (I) in Punjab. But the Congress game resulted in bringing the militants to the center stage which posed a discomforting and dangerous scenario, it therefore, became imperative for the rulers in Delhi to marginalize the militants and rehabilitate the Akalis. The Longowal-Rajiv accord was signed to accomplish this objective. Blinded by their lust for “Chairs,” the Barnala-Balwant combine acted as willing pawns in sabotaging the gathering momentum of the Sikh freedom movement.
The crafty rulers in Delhi had anticipated that Militants would react to this sabotage and challenge the Akalis. The militants rightly and understandably rejected the accord but walked straight into the government trap when they left the field open to the Akalis. They did not realize that Sikh masses would not heed to the boycott call, anxious as they were to get rid of the Congress (I) rule that, after Operation Bluestar and Operation Wood-rose, had come to be identified as an instrument of plunder and persecution. Had they foreseen Delhi’s game-plan, they could have easily upset its apple-cart.
Since military occupation of the Punjab was increasingly under fire in International forums, the government of Rajiv considered it prudent to temporarily hand over the turbulent state to “convenient” Sikhs. But the massive mandate to Akalis was too disturbing a situation to be allowed to continue for long. To ward off any danger of hawks among the Akalis enacting some precipitous legislation, Delhi recruited a band of criminals known as ‘Red Guards’ or ‘Ribeiro’s Killer Squads.” Their job was to unleash a reign of lawlessness. They were deployed to kill indiscriminately, particularly rural Sikhs who were considered backbone of the militant movement. This plan had a dual purpose to discredit and alienate the militants and to force the Barnala government to send police into the Golden Temple. By making Barnala stage the Operation Black Thunder I, Rajiv Gandhi killed two birds with one stone. He justified his mother’s attack on the Golden Temple as well as created a vertical split in the Akali Dal.
‘The dismissal of Barnala Ministry was designed to play one faction of the Akali Dal against the other. But it only helped to bring the Militants to the forefront. Once again the movement for a sovereign Sikh state assumed threatening proportions and Delhi realized its folly of weakening the pliable and spineless Akali Dal. Consequently it has decided to again boost up the Akalis, but only for a limited purpose of stealing the thunder from the militants. It has no intentions of repeating history. Before striking any deal with the Akalis, it would first like to neutralize the militant movement by using both force and fraud.
On the one hand, the Pepsi-Cola project and other industrial and agricultural incentives are designed to provide the illusive “healing touch”. On the other hand the militants are being painted as a house divided against itself. The unfortunate unwillingness of various militant groups to work under one central leadership is being exploited to give the impression that militants are incapable of providing political leadership to the Sikhs. The dubious role of Bhai Jasbir Singh is being deliberately highlighted to hurt the credibility of the militant leaders. After destroying Bhai Jasbir Singh, the government is bound to direct its attack on leaders like Simranjit Singh Mann and Gen. Narinder Singh. These are the only two senior leaders who have so far remained unscathed of the blemishes that the agents of the Indian government have been hurling at the front ranking Sikh leaders.
Sikh struggle has reached a point where militants can ill-afford to indulge in mutual bickering or narrow personality clashes. They have a stupendous responsibility and their path is littered with hurdles and hardships. The time to continue as autonomous “Missals’ is long over. They have to have a new Ranjit Singh if they wish to carve out a sovereign Sikh state. They will have to put their faith in one leader and jealously guard his credibility. The idea of collective leadership may be historically inspiring and theoretically attractive but in Practice it seldom works. ‘Too many cooks spoil the broth,’ is not an empty adage. The sooner this realization dawns upon them the better for the Sikhs.
Article extracted from this publication >> November 4, 1988
