The single most important question worrying most people on the question of Punjab is not who was responsible for the situation, nor even how people are being oppressed today. Instead, people say: “yes, yes, all that you say about who is responsible may be true; but what is the way out now? Or is there no way out?”  The answer is yes, there most certainly is a way out, and the forces which can bring about a lasting solution are already active. First, there are the common people. They have suffered at the hands of both communal terrorists and State machinery, and have , spontaneously come into struggle from time to time against whichever’ force immediately oppresses them. Outside Punjab the impression given by the Government is that the police under Ribeiro have beeii bravely taking on the terrorists. The truth is, whereas the police have shown cowardice and inaction, unarmed people have repeatedly shown exemplary courage and initiative in catching communal 2 terrorists. This fact has not been even remarked upon by the _ media—either official or privately-owned.

Spontaneous resistance of common people , The team found many such instances on its tour. In Sang111r, at village Pahlwan, Karnail Singh, a terrorist who had robbed. Its. 13,000 from a Hindu at gunpoint, was chased by all manner of villagers. Finally, he threw down the money as he ran; but the villagers continued chasing him, and caught him.

Near village Sanghera, some traders travelling in a car were stopped by armed communal terrorists who demanded that they take them in the opposite direction. It was about 4 p. m. The car owner tried to shoot one of the terrorists with a pistol, and the terrorists shot back, killing one of the traders. Sikh village women nearby, seeing the scene, immediately began flinging bricks at the terrorists, thus saving the remaining (3) traders from certain death. Then the sarpanch of the (predominantly Sikh) village, along with farmers carrying spades, chased the terrorists to the next ,village, where they were caught and handed over to the police. On occasion, when the people catch communal terrorists and hand them over to the police, the police not only claim the reward for themselves but publicly finish of the terrorist without the niceties of legal procedure. For example, on June 15 at 5.30 a. m., two communal terrorists arrived at a , petrol pump in Malikpur, near Pathankot. They asked for the keys to the room where the money was kept. The employee said he did not have them, so they shot him dead with a country pistol. Towards noon people identified the terrorists, still wandering about the area, and caught them. The BSF and the police came and asked the terrorists their names. The police argued that they should be arrested; the BSF said no, and killed them on the spot. In Narot Mehra, a predominantly Hindu village in Pathankot tehsil, at 7 a. m., on April 2, communal terrorists attacked the shop of one Nagarmal. Nagarmal had earlier been threatened, so the police provided him with a gunman, Paramjit Singh. The terrorists killed Paramjit as well as an innocent customer at the shop. They snatched the sten gun and a scooter, and drove off to a nearby village. Common people of Narot Mehra were in hot pursuit. People from about six other villages got news of the incident and joined the search carrying their own weapons. They surrounded the terrorists in the fields. Only then did the police arrive on the scene. There was firing on both sides, in which two terrorists were killed. The remaining one surrendered. The police extracted information from him about the others, and then, in the presence of all the assembled people, the police shot him dead. Such acts are not committed so as to tackle communal terrorism. They are intended as public re-assertions of the brute force of the State. Courage was shown by the common Sikhs and Hindus of Paniar-Gandhian villages in Gurdaspur, who in the first week of March surrounded armed communal terrorists in a sugarcane field and forced them to surrender. Reports of common villagers catching communal terrorists also came from Ranike and Bahmanian village near Sangrur, Hoshiarpur, Tarn Taran, and Bakhatpur village near Gurdaspur. A similar incident was also reported from Kapurthala district during the team’s stay in Punjab. – ‘ , – No Hindu communal organisation has had the courage to tackle communal terrorists or catch them; Army, police and para-military forces have a miserable record in doing so; but time and again common villagers have shown they can do so. Spontaneous and militant struggle was also displayed by Sikhs during the Khalistanis’ attempt to foist a 13-point “social reform” programme on the Sikhs—including a bin on liquor shops, cigarette shops, barber’s saloons, meat shops, giving and taking of dowry, marriage parties of more than 11 persons, and so on. Many Sikhs, – offenaed at this attempt to interfere with their personal lives, defied these dictates. In particular, Mazbhi (scheduled caste) Sikhs showed open defiance and banded together in many villages of badly terrorist affected districts to resist communal terrorist attacks. Communal terrorists attacked a Mazbhi Sikh marriage party in Khara on the issue of men drinking liquor, and injured a Sikh girl.

Landless labour fights back landlord-Khalistani combine:

 The class bias of the communal terrorists towards landlords and rich peasants also brought Sikh agricultural labourers into spontaneous and militant struggle against them. For example, in Naushehra Pannuan village near Tarn Taran in Amritsar district, rich landowners and the AISSF formed an Action Committee to attempt to reduce the harvesting wages of the agricultural labourers. The gang of Gurbachan Singh Manochahal (one of the Panthic Committee members) and Avtar Singh Brahma are active in the Tarn Taran and Patti tehsils.1.. Gurbachan Singh, Manochahal’s father, was the head of the Action Committee, and agricultural labourers were threatened that Gurbachan Singh Manochahal’s armed terrorists would teach the workers a,. lesson. Police and the local administration did nothing to protect the workers. . The workers, however, resisted all threats, physical blockades,: and rumours. They organised massive demonstrations armed with traditional weapons, and guarded themselves at night with traditional arms, bricks, and pebbles. They successfully struck work to maintain., the wage rates. Activists of the Khet Mazdoor Union of the CPI(M) entered the agitation, took the leadership, and mobilised workers from the surrounding villages. Finally, the demand was conceded. Rich farmers in the nearby villages of Khara, Nathu Ke Burj, and Dhotian also tried similar blockades; again, initially through spontaneous struggless and rallies, then under the banner of the Khet Mazdoor Union, workers were victorious in defending their rights. Workers of Sirhali village also struck work and raised their wages. Similar successful struggles were reported in Megha and Dal villages of Patti tehsil.

Deepak Dhawan :

Them team met the family of Deepak Dhawan, the youngest CPI(M) State Committee member, who organised the agricultural labourers in the Tarn Taran region. Deepak Dhawan had been a communist since his student days when he had been active in the Students’ Federation of India. He later preferred to work among agricultural labour, though he had been offered a party post in Jalandhar city. Despite the threat posed by Khalistanis, he preferred not to carry a revolver, because he felt the credibility of the leadership would suffer. He had also taken up the case of torture and murder of an innocent by the CRPF at Moju Majhra village. Due to his persistent efforts, a magisterial enquiry had been appointed and its findings had indicted the police. On the morning of May 19 this year, a journalist, a Narinder Pal Singh, was killed by communal terrorists at Tarn Taran. The CRPF was posted a short distance away, but did nothing. Through Dhawan’s efforts, a post-mortem was quickly done and the police promised to pursue the terrorists. Later in the afternon, at 2.30 p. m., Dhawan was cycling from village Sanga to another village to deliver some messages to comrades. The same gang which had killed the journalist -shot at Dhawan. He struggled with them for some distance, but ‘ultimately died. The body was found an hour later. The police claim that they pursued the terrorist for 50 km. But actually, after murder-! ing Dhawan, the same gang murdered a nearby doctor (who had earlier been warned that he would be “seen to”. So, in effect, the police do not seem to have moved an inch.  However, Dhawan’s family—a father, two brothers and a sister–continue to believe in the philosophy he believed in. His father, a doctor, said ; “Others have died not doing anything. Deepak died doing something.” Deepak’s younger brother Sanjay, is active in the SFI at Gum Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. After he had been organising a function in memory of Shahid Bhagat Singh the AISSF (who are only 2 in’ the department of 40, but who possess outside -backing) attacked Sanjay. No police or university action was taken against the attacker. Eventually however, students brought pressure so that the main culprit apologised, first to Sanjay’s sister and later to Sanjay. The agricultural labourers who had fought under the banner of Khet Mazdoor Union are not demoralised; they are determined to continue the fight.

Perspectives :

The forces organising conscious resistance to the communal fanatics have their own distinct perspectives and programmes. The team could meet representatives of the CPI, the Revolutionary Unity Centre, and the Front Against Repression and Communalism, CPI(M) leaders declined to meet the team. CPI leader Satyapal Dang described the situation as the outcome of the Akali-Congress electoral tussle, the rising demands of ambitious capitalist farmers, and the desire of imperialist powers to weaken India. The last, he felt, was the crucial factor. He did not feel the Indian ruling classes wanted a division of the country. Therefore, insofar as Akalis, Congress, the BJP, and other such parties can be rallied to oppose all sorts of communalism, the CPI feels it is necessary to rally them. Even if they only agree to put their names to a leaflet condemning communalism, it is worthwhile. Further, since communists of all hues have a total following of only about 15 percent of the population, it is necessary to have. joint rallies with Akalis and Congress to reach out to the following of these parties, too. Apart from this, Dang said, the communists must have the independent activity against the communalists. This activity must be three-fold. Misguided youth must be persuaded and won over. Professional cold-blooded ‘killers must be dealt with by – the administration with a ‘firm hand (if necessary, held without trial, under NSA). The CPI feels that the State machinery can fight the communal terrorists, if the people are mobilised to back this fight, And finally, every individual case of police excess must be taken up. For example, he cited the case of a young Sikh youth who, after his marriage, went driving in a jeep with his friend. They were

wearing kesari turbans. When they didn’t stop at the CRPF signal the CRPF men, shot all of them. Dang pointed out that if the communists had not taken up such issues the Sikh communal organisations would have done so. However, Dang said that it was necessary to oppose the demands for Ribeiro’s transfer, as Ribeiro was an honest officer, not susceptible to politicians’ pressure. From what the team saw on its tour, however, there was no ‘basis for such an assessment of the State’s role in Punjab. People were being assaulted and terrorised, not protected or assisted, by the police and paramilitary forces. Nor had the Government shown any sincere desire to fight communalism; on the contrary, all of the parties in government had fostered its growth. Ribeiro himself had openly justified extra-legal killings by the police, thus not only legitimising State terror but providing the Khalistanis further fuel for their propaganda. The CPI has campaigned against the communal terrorists in all the areas under its influence, organising jathas of volunteers to go from village to village and openly speak against the Khalistani ideology. The jathas are accompanied by armed volunteers. Because of their struggle, around 35 CPI cadre have fallen to bullets of communal terrorists since the rise of the Bhindranwale phenomenon. Many of those who died were killed as they returned from anti-K halistani rallies. It is worth noting that nowhere the team went could it see _ any slogans, posters, leaflets, demonstration, marches, or any other activity of the AISSF, the Hindu Shiv Sena, the Congress, and Akal factions, or any other party, except those of the Left. Even in the worst terrorist-affected areas, we saw posters, slogans, and evidence of activity by communist organisations of various hues. Congress, BJP and Akali workers themselves omitted to the team that their parties had not .taken up any campaigns (contrary to the publicity about “mass contact”). The only organised forces active among the people, and hence in practical conflict with communalists, are the parties and mass organisations of the Left.

Long March :

The Revolutionary Unity Centre, Punjab, was formed on November 8, 1986, by the CPI (ML) C.P. Reddy group, the CPI (ML) S.N. Singh group, Revolutionary Communist Party (Jaikara group), I.W.P. Marxist Study Centre, and many independent