Congress and Akalis, jockeying for power. Itis these parties who promoted them and even openly allied with them. Further, as we shall see in Chapter VL, the Khalistanis have aligned themselves from place to place in the rural areas with landlords, attempting to win over the landowning ants and attacking landless labour, They also have close ties with smugglers, who in turn have ties with high- ranking officials in the police and civil administrator, (For example the present head in absentia of the Unified Akali Dal, Simranjit Singh Mann, was formerly Deputy Inspector, General of Police, Punjab.) Top Akali politicians who have promoted the communal terrorists include major landlords and reported smugglers.

In the Press we are given the imprison that all the Khalistani factions and communal-terrorist: gangs are the same, and work in a coordinated-way for their political objective. This is not correct. Actually, like all ruling class factions, they pursue a purely opportunist course of splits, mergers, and shifting position according to what they see as immediate political gain, So sharp is the cleavage between various communal-terrorist gangs that they even assault one another.

This shows to what extent they are actually the armed bands of various political leaders.

The Indian Government ascribes virtually the entire phenomenon of communal terrorism to the “foreign hand”, by which it means Pakistan and its (unnamed) backers. The CPI and CPI(M) place central responsibility for communal terrorism on American and British imperialism with the assistance of Pakistan. The team felt it necessary to put the question of foreign support for the Khalistanis in the proper perspective.

It was widely reported to the team in the border districts that Pakistan had given some communal terrorists military training and shelter. The easy flow of weapons to the communal terrorists also strongly suggests the involvement of the Pakistani government, The protagonists of Pakistan might justify it as a retaliatory exercise against the reported interference by India in the former’s internal affairs. Both governments us¢ allegations against the other to cover their own misdeeds. .

Given the closeness of Pakistan to the U.S. and other Western countries, and India’s closeness to the U.S.S.R., it is also probable that rivalries between these powers in the subcontinent have helped to sustain and aggravate the situation in Punjab. For its part, the Soviet Union has voiced support for every repressive step and black law of the Indian Government in relation to Punjab. The slogan of “Khalistan”, while not gaining currency in Punjab, has for over a decade been promoted by a well-off section of Sikhs abroad, whose activities and monetary support for the Khalistanis are not checked by the governments of the U.K., U.S., Canada, and Germany. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, self-appointed head of the so-called “National Council of Khalistan”, operates out of the U.K. and visits the ULS., Canada, and Europe, despite having been deprived of his Indian passport. Ganga Singh Dhillon. who heads the World Sikh Conterenee, and propagates that Sikhs are a separate nation, maintains close links with American legislators and officials. Certain known communal terrorists, such as retired General Bhullar, one of the accused in the Lala Jagat Narain case, have taken shelter in the U.S.

However, the Indian Government has no right to) produce the “foreign hand” theory as the reason for the present situation, In the first place, it is not the basic cause, which is, as we have seen, firmly rooted in the electoral politics of the two main parties in Punjab, and in the calculated actions of the Central Government itself. Politicians in India have also supplied communal terrorists with ample arms. Moreover, it is well known that both Chauhan and Dhillon” were earlier intimately tied with the Congress itself. Chauhan had jointly led the 1969 Congress-engineered defections which brought down the first Akali ministry, and then became a minister in’ the Congress- supported rebel Akali ministry. Giani Zail Singh himself presided over a session of Dhillon’s World Sikh Conference in the USA, Aside from this, as we have mentioned above, the Dal Khalsa, Bhindran- wale, Balbir Singh Sandhu and innumerable others have been promo- ted in the first place by the Congress-1, Khalistani terrorism is the monster child Of electoral politics, particularly that of the Congress-1, The Government is only trumpeting the “foreign hand” theory in order to cover up its own criminal role in grooming the Khalistanis.

By contrast, it must be noted, the Khalistan slogan has never had a foothold among common Sikhs. Even today the Khalistanis* claims of running a “‘parallel government’ do not mean they have such strong popular support: in some area that they can set up their own State power. It only means that there are certain areas where their extortion, terrorizing and attacks are so concentrated that people are afraid to defy them openly.

instituted. The Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act were brought into force. Under these acts, ordinary policemen and soldiers are invested with Powers to shoot at sight to kill, and a case can be filed against them only with the permission of the Central Government. These powers were brought on the excuse of controlling terrorism, but actually were amply employed by the I State machinery on common people. Communal terrorists went –

scot-free; killing of innocents continued and_ intensified greatly in April 1984.

Yet it was in this very period that the then General Secretary of the Congress-1 (our present Prime Minister) stated in Chandigarh that Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was only a religious man, with no political {ambitions (!). Throughout this period, the Government asserted that it would not enter the Golden Temple to arrest the culprits of the various murders. Thus on the one hand, they assured the murderers a safe haven and, on the other, made the question of entry into the Temple a major issue.

On June 4, 1984, the Army launched ‘Operation Bluestar’. This was an assault on the Golden Temple with the stated intention of flushing out the communal terrorists. For several days before the assault, it did not stop the entry of either terrorists or innocent pilgrims into the Golden Temple. The day chosen for the assault itself was the day of the martyrdom of Guru Arjan Dev, and many innocent people had come to make their offerings. Many volunteers of the Akali Dal (Longowal) had also come to the Golden Temple. The communal terrorists, were, of course, also there, heavily armed, and they resisted the Army attack.

Accounts of Bluestar :

The team found that common villagers who were at the Golden Temple during operation Bluestar are still haunted by the experience. This can be seen in the narration the team heard. The team wonders how this experience must have been exploited by communal elements, The team heard the accounts of two persons from very different backgrounds who had been in the temple during Bluestar. One was the account of Sardar Jang Singh, an Akali Dal (Longowal) activist of Kanjhla village, Sangrur. He had led a jatha of 350 villagers, including women, children, and even a few non-Sikhs, into the Golden Temple on June 3. There had already been exchange of fire between Bhindranwale’s men and the Army. But the pilgrims were not stopped from entering. On June 4, firing by the Army began without warning.

The volunteers went to Teja Singh Samundari hall as the firing continued. The water tank was hit and demolished on June 6, and there was no water supply. Later, on the same day, the tanks rolled in, and all unarmed persons surrendered themselves. But it was in army custody that the pilgrims were hit by a hand grenade and were also hit by bullets. The Army claimed it was the terrorists who had killed them, but Jang Singh points out that the Army men had moved back before the grenade was thrown as if by signal. In all 41 persons in this jatha alone were killed during operation Bluestar. Jang Singh provided the team with a detailed list of persons killed, consisting largely of Sikhs, but also including a Hindu women and a Bihari boy. Aside from this, the survivors were very badly maltreated by the Army, denied water, kept for long hours packed in tiny rooms, and so on. Of the survivors 16 are still kept in Jodhpur.

The team also met Jagga Singh, a common peasant of Sangrur village. He and his family had gone to the Golden Temple on June 3, one day prior to Bluestar. He had bought a new truck and had gone to make offerings for his success. They were not stopped by the Army from entering. When firing started early on June 4, the whole family moved to Guru Ram Das Serai. The family divided into two sections, one on the lower level and one on the upper. On June 5, at 12 noon, a hand grenade was thrown into the upper room. Hand grenades were lobbed into the room where Jagga Singh was, and several were killed. He was first hit by a grenade splinter. Then. as he was coming down the stairs at 5 A. M. on June 6, a soldier put the barrel of a gun against the side of his leg and fired, scarring the calf of his leg.

Later all the survivors were put into a bus at 7 A.M. It took the bus 8 hours to get to the hospital, Just 2 km away. Jagga Singh handed over his !4 year-old child to his 13 year old sister. The child, Jasbir Singh, was sent with the 13 year old girl to jail, and remained there with the girl for 34 months, until a Supreme Court order released all minors in Punjab jails (at the time there were about 1,200). Jagga Singh himself was in police custody in the hospital for 63 days before he was released—on bail, since criminal charges were filed against him. He has had to return to court 4 times since then, and the case is continuing. His younger sister was deeply disturbed by the events that she still has not recovered her mental balance.

The exact number of dead in the assault on the Golden Temple is difficult to tabulate, but it is safe to say that the Government figures are gross underestimates. Various organisations and news reporters have made estimates several times as high. More importantly, it seems clear that the administration made no effort to see that innocent people did not get killed.

On the contrary, not only were innocents ‘allowed to enter the Temple even when it was known that the temple would be attacked; but once army assault started, even obviously unarmed people were killed or subjected to brutality. Some people ask the question what was the alternative to an attack on the Golden Temple to flush out terrorists?”” Actually, the situation was first instigated and later allowed to fester by the same * forces who later sent in the army.

If the Government had at any time been serious about checking commnal terrorism it could have done so at any point during several years preceding the attack. On the contrary, it allowed such a situation to build up, and eventually, with maximum brutality and fanning of chauvinistic sentiment in other parts of India, it presented itself as a military saviour of the Hindus

 Common Sikhs’ anger with Centre, not with Hindus:

It Despite this grave provocation, despite the fact that the Golden Temple itself was especially dear to the Sikhs, and despite the fact. That common Sicks were outraged at the assault, it is an indication of the sheer sturdiness of Hindu-Sikh relations in Punjab that no massacre of Hindus took place even at this juncture. The rest of India Delhi, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Assam ; and so on have all witnessed, in the last few years mob violence between Hindus and Muslims. Similarly, in November 1984 Congress-I led mobs massacred innocent Sikhs in large numbers in cities through: out India. By contrast, it is worth noting that, apart from certain limited instances of mob violence in cities in Punjab (and that too in the much more recent phases), no cases of mass communal rioting was: reported in this state.

For example, a huge congregation of 20,000 met in Bir Baba. Budha Gurudwara in Amritsar district after the news of Operation’ Bluestar leaked out. The people wanted to ‘march to Amritsar to defend the Golden Temple. A handful of Bhindranwale Supporters called for killings of Hindus in the villages as retaliation; but their call was resoundingly rejected. Later the Army forcibly dispersed the gathering.

 The assault on the Golden .Temple added yet another issue to the already numerous unresolved issues relating to Punjab: that the Army “deserters”. On June 10, simple Sikh Army jawans, on hearing about Operation Bluestar and refusing to believe the Government version of it, revolted in their regiments in various parts of India and made their way to Amritsar. Most were captured and incarcerated; some were killed, apparently in cold blood, by the Army.

 Centre’s continuing atrocities :

After this too followed events with which we cannot deal in detail here, as they are important topics in themselves. The first was Operation Wood rose—the combing operation by the Army in the villages of the northern districts of Punjab, during which large number of innocents were tortured and some killed. Some instances of this operation, investigated and compiled by AFDR, are given in an appendix. This operation intensified the sense of anger among the people, furthered the alienation of the Sikh community, and afforded fertile ground for the Sikh communalists.

Meanwhile, a degenerate Nihang sant of Zail Singh vintage, Baba Santa Singh, was employed by the Central Government for the “Kar Seva” of the Golden Temple—ie, the religious act of rebuilding the shattered shrine—amid a host of television cameras. Santa Singh had so little support that, even with full Army protection, his jatha consisted largely of hired men, hired by Congress (I). Meanwhile the Akalis took advantage of this ploy to intensify Sikh outrage and aggravate wounded sentiments. The Akalis demanded that the Temple be kept in an unrepaired state, as a reminder of the mass- acre.

Further, in November 1984, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, a large number of Sikhs about 3,500—were massacred in Delhi; the homes and property of many more were destroyed; massacres also took place in Kanpur, Patna and Bokaro, and anti- Sikh violence was reported at 43 other places throughout India. However, what all the reports on these incidents have demonstrated is that these were by no means Hindu-Sikh riots in that, ordinary Hindus were not involved in killing Sikhs. On the contrary, it has been demonstrated in detail in various thorough investigative reports that it was the Congress-I politicians, with the help of the State machinery (ranging from the police to the Delhi Transport Corporation) who carried out the entire massacre. There are many heroic instances of Hindu neighbors in those days giving shelter to Sikhs at risk to—and even at the cost of—their lives. At the same time despite this even graver provocation, the anticipated reaction from Punjab did not come. The Hindu minority in the villages of Punjab, who are so small in number that they could very easily be at the mercy of the Sikh inhabitants, were not harmed at all.

Aside from the glaring role of the Congress-I and State machinery in the Delhi riots, the situation was further aggravated by the following actions: I Rajiv Gandhi’s justification of the massacre at a public rally (“When a great tree falls, the mother earth shakes’’): the Congress-I’s chauvinistic election campaign for the Lok Sabha; and Government’s inordinate delay in constituting a Commission of Enquiry into the riots; and, finally, the actual conduct of the Com- mission, when it was eventually constituted; and so on.

Repressive measures aimed at democratic movement

Meanwhile. the hand of State repression fell also on labour and peasant unions and on democratic rights activists. The various repressive measures restricted the open activity of democratic forces, but were no check on the terrorists’ mode of operation. An AFDR translation in Punjabi, of the PUDR-PUCL report on the November 1984 Delhi riots, which in an introduction had also analyzed the genesis of the Punjab problem, quickly sold out its first edition of 5,000 copies; but 7,000 copies of its second edition were seized by the Superintendent of Police, Jalandhar, in February 1915, and charges of sedition were laid. The second edition had actually carried an appendix describing how common Hindus in the riots had helped their Sikh neighbors. Further, in the same month, 164 activists of the Bhartiya Kisan Union in Sangrur and Gurdaspur were arrested under Sc. 124(A) (Sedition), although they were agitating on purely an economic demand.

In the course of all these events, the Central Government brought about an array of repressive laws on the excuse of having to control the situation in Punjab. These laws constitute a formidable obstacle not only to any democratic movement in Punjab, but anywhere in India, since these laws apply to the whole country. These laws give the state machinery license to kill without prosecution; to seize homes; to evacuate areas; to detain persons for up to two years

without trial: to try accused in camera, in special courts where witness are not revealed and guilt of the accused is presumed; to declare virtually any leaflet, song, speech, book, public meeting, strike, procession, or any other legitimate democratic activity to be a terrorist act; to mete out the death sentence for so- called “‘terrorist acts’” and so on. We list some of the provisions of these Act in Appendix III.

 Two factions strike a deal :

In August 1985 in a sudden turnabout, the two warring factions which had engendered the entire ‘Punjab problem’—the Congress and the Akalis —arrived at a gentlemanly agreement to halt their conflict, and to collaborate instead. This was the Rajiv-Longowal Punjab Accord.

The accord consists of 11 points. Out of these, 4 points related to issues created solely by the machinations of these same two parties during the course of their tussle—viz, compensation to innocents killed in the Akali agitation; enquiry into the November riots; rehabilitation of those discharged from the Army; and disposal of cases pending in the special courts. (Significantly, the Accord did not involve the repeal of a single black act passed by the Centre on the excuse of Punjab.) Some other points are vague : promotion of Punjabi language, representation of minorities, merit-based recruitment into the Army.

But crucial provisions were left for later settlement and continued tussle. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which the Congress had called secessionist in its election campaign, was referred to the Sarkaria Commission (insofar as it deals with Centre-state relations). The sharing of river waters was referred to a Supreme Court judge. The transfer of Chandigarh was tied once again to the question of return of certain Hindi-speaking areas in Punjab to Haryana: the location of these areas was left to a commission. Other boundary claims of Punjab and Haryana were referred to a separate commission.

In effect, the issues about which the Akalis and the Congress claimed to have been so agitated were left unresolved. The real issue settled by the Accord was not even mentioned in the text : that the Congress tacitly accepted the installation of an Akali ministry in Punjab, and Akalis tacitly accepted co-operation and close co- ordination with the Congress-1 Central Government. From. this we can see the real issues at stake between the Akali and the Congress.

But never mind that the Accord did not touch the basic problems of the Punjabi people; never mind that it did not even touch the issues purportedly at stake in the ensure agitation: the Accord was presented to the people as an achievement in itself.

Centre and Akalis keep the pot boiling

The Barnala Government that assumed office following the elections followed a policy of coordinating closely with the Centre and simultaneously shielding the communal terrorists. The Justice Bains Committee, appointed by the Akali Government, which gave a general amnesty to persons held under various politically related offences, is widely reported to have set free known communal terrorists. The orientation of Justice Bains has become even clearer today. He is operating under the direct guidance of the Sikh communal fanatics, and has recently presided over certain open functions organised by Khalistani groups. Various Akali ministers, particularly the co-operatives minister Prem Singh Chandumajra, were accused of shielding terrorists or getting them freed. Harpreet Singh, son of Akali minister of local bodies, Mohinder Singh Saiyanwala, was arrested by police for consorting with known terrorists, but was released on bail under pressure from his father.

At the same time, the close political links of the Inspector – General of Police Punjab, Julio Ribeiro, with the Centre, and the presence of a large contingent of the Central Reserve Police Force, gave the Centre a direct role even in respect of law and order in Punjab. Various repressive measures, such as fake encounters, have been lionized by Hindu chauvinists and the Congress-I as evidence of Ribeiro’s bravery in “tackling terrorism”. Dissident Akali politicians. and Sikh communalists, meanwhile, labeled Ribeiro as “anti-Sikh”, and termed every curb on communalists as an act of repression.

 

The Sikh communal forces in this period actually reorganized themselves and made increasingly strenuous efforts to bring down the Barnala government. In January 1986, at a “Sarbat Khalsa” congregation organised by the All India Sikh Students’ Federation (AISSF), United Akali Dal (UAD), and the Damdami Taksal, a five-member “Panthic Committee’? was chosen. On April 29 1986, it openly declared that it was fighting for Khalistan—a categorical statement that none of the open political forces had been willing to make earlier. On July 25, at Muktsar, Khalistani terrorists massacred ‘every clean-shaven passenger of a bus, heightening the existing tensions.

Meanwhile elaborate Army exercises (“Operation Brasstacks’”) underhandedly installed the Army in the border regions. A scheme for creating a five-kilometre wide strip as a “security zone” was- mooted. This scheme would involve the eviction of tens of thousands of peasants from the border zones. Naturally the scheme evoked widespread resentment.

Akali leaders, such as Badal and Tohra, who were not satisfied with the allocation of the spoils of office, organised a faction in the Akali Dal. New jathedars of the Akal Takht were elected. The head jathedar, Professor Darshan Singh Ragi, began operating as the mouthpiece of the Khalistani factions. Darshan Singh commanded that all factions of the Akali Dal should dissolve and merge into one organization an obvious method of bringing down the Barnala Ministry. The Badal-Tohra faction responded, and merged with the party of Joginder Singh (Bhindranwale’s aged father) to form the Unified Akali Dal. The Barnala government now continued with” Congress support in the legislature.

The Central Government and the Congress-I continued vocal support to the Barnala government until the beginning of May 1987. Then, suddenly, it switched over to sharp criticism. This criticism signalled the Centre’s decision to dismiss the ministry on May 11, for narrow political considerations (in part for obtaining political benefit for the Haryana elections, and as part of the Centre’s ongoing talks with Khalistani factions see Chapter IV). President’s Rule followed, along with mass arrests and promises of “firm steps”? to check communal terrorism —which, presumably, were not being taken by the earlier government. However, by July, two Tajor massacres of bus passengers at Lalru in Patiala and Fatehbad in the bordering district of Haryana—demonstrated that President’s Rule had in no way helped tackle the communal terrorists. It is in this context that the team went to Punjab to examine the present situation.