The Indian Cabinet last week sprang a surprise by announcing that the proposal to hold elections in Kashmir is being dropped. The prime minister had declared rather firmly after the burning of CharareShrief that the government would stick to the schedule of holding elections before July 18. In fact, the burning of the historic shrine itself was a part of the Indian scheme, The game plan was that the proposed poll would be boycotted by the Kashmiri people and that the shrine burning would cause the Hindu voters to swing in favor of Congress(I) rather than the BJP.

As such, the aim was to set up a Punjab type minority government in Kashmir, The apparent reason given by the Indian government was that Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan did not find the climate favorable. But the real reason could be different.

Indian intelligence agencies had been busy all these months arresting and releasing Kashmiri leaders. The official plank was that the government was trying to persuade Kashmiri leaders to participate in the elections. Efforts were made to show to the world public opinion that as a democratic country, India was trying to restore democracy in Kashmir while Pakistan as an antidemocratic country was blocking the way. In this manner, the election idea had been projected as a fight between democracy and dictatorship, but the reality was altogether different. India is mighty afraid of elections under the U.N. supervision. There were Reports in the Indian media that the Hurriat conference had a secret plan to contest the elections. The Hurriat stands as much for freedom as the armed militant groups in Kashmir, The Hurriyat plan threatened to upset the entire Indian game plan, the result is indefinite postponement of the elections, Nevertheless, it goes to the Indian credit that it has succeeded in creating an impression that India is bent upon reviving democracy in Kashmir while militants and Pakistan are trying to scuttle the process.

That Indian rulers are past masters at political games is an established fact. There is need for looking at the CharareSharief developments in retrospect. Look at how India mobilized lakhs of army men into Kashmir three months ahead of the operation. The ‘operation itself was to coincide with the elections. A majority of the top brass at Chrarc Kashmir comprised Sikh army officers. This is atypical Indian Brahmanical method of fooling the world about Indian secularism. The aim was to ensure that the Kashmiri annoyance at the Chrar attack should be diverted towards Sikhs and not Brahmans, the latter being the real plotters of the game. To create the necessary climate in favor of Sikh Brahman “Bhai Bhai,” a big group of Kashmiri Brahmans was sent to Anandpur Sahib to pray there and to remember Guru Tegh Bahadur. The Kashmiri Brahmans recalled the great sacrifices made by the ninth Sikh Guru for the protection of Brahmans. Ordinary Sikhs who saw Brahmans in Anandpur Sahib were wondenneg as to why the Kashmin Brahmans are remembenne Gun Tegh Bahadur alter hundreds of years. India tried to put into practice in Kashmir its Punjab experience of installing a minority government, But evidently Kashmiris are much too clever for Indian Brahmans. Could not Sikhs in 1991 adopt a similar strategy of joining the electoral politics of gain credibility forthe Sikh movement as democratic leader of Sikhs? Perhaps, not. Because the Sikh militant politics was not mature enough to face the Brahmanic games. The militants did not know how and with what slogans and program to conduct government. ‘There was every danger of the Sikh militant movement degenerating into parliamentary politics. In any case, the Indian government would not at all have held the election, in Punjab. There was another uncertainty. The Akalis were not sincere about the Sikh cause. They said one thing and did another. The Akali Dals are no Humiat.

In any case, the Kashmiri people deserve to be complimented on their political victory over the Indian rulers. At least tactically the Indian plans in Kashmir have suffered a serious setback.

Article extracted from this publication >>  June 2, 1995