Pursuant to our appointment as a fact finding enquiry committee by Mr Justice A.S. Bains (Retd.) on behalf of Punjab Human Rights Organisation to appraise the desirability, necessity or justification of the police firing in Chandigarh on March 21, 1986; we, K.T.S Tulsi, Advocate and Sanjeev Gaur, Correspondent, The Telegraph, started our work on March 22, 1986. In all we examined sixteen witnesses.
We have carefully examined the version of the Chandigarh Administration. Punjab Government, All India Sikh Student’s Federation, Damdami Taksal and the statements of independent eye witnesses. We divide our report into two parts: a) Sequence of events, and b) Conclusions.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
According to the direct evidence available with us the demonstrators started their journey for the purposed gherao of the Punjab Assembly in two groups. The first group made its way to Chandigarh in about 60 trucks under the leadership of Baba Joginder Singh. This Jatha was stopped near Jagraon by the Punjab Police, on 20th afternoon. It has transpired that during their stoppage at Jagraon at least two leaders representing the protestors established contact with the Chief Minister of Punjab, Mr Surjit Singh Barnala. One of them established telephonic contact from Jagraon itself while the other leader spoke to the Chief Minister (C.M) of Punjab over the phone from Kapurthala. These leaders tried to impress upon the C.M that they should be allowed to pass and assured him that the protest would be peaceful. They also suggested that the C.M. should receive their memorandum near the Vidhan Sabha (Assembly). The C.M. expressed his inability to accept their suggestion for security reasons but suggested that the memorandum could be given to one of the Ministers. This suggestion was not acceptable to the other side.
Whatever else may have transpired, one thing is certain that the Punjab Government did not try to prevent the further movement of the jathas (groups).
The second group reached Chandigarh by the morning train from Amritsar. They numbered about one thousand. When they reached Chandigarh Railway Station no attempt was made to stop their entry. Similarly, when the jathas led by Baba Joginder Singh reached Chandigarh around 1 A.M. on 21st March, Chandigarh Administration made a symbolic protest against their entry. However, they accepted the assurance of the leaders that the protest would be conducted peacefully and that they would allow themselves to be searched. At the same time the administration took immediate steps to reinforce their force and got 8-9 companies of B.S.F. airlifted on 21st morning to be able to meet any eventuality.
THE INCIDENT
About seven to eight thousand demonstrators who had spent several hours at the Parade Ground in a peaceful manner, and were instructed by Baba Joginder Singh to remain peaceful under all circumstances, started their trek for Vidhan Sabha around 10.00 A.M. The head of the procession reached the first barricade around 10.25 a.m. They crossed the first barricade without ‘et or hindrance. Then, they broke through the second barricade but the police did not try to forcibly obstruct their progress. The demonstrators were moving at a brisk pace and for about twelve minutes they moved unchecked. Many of these (in the front section) had unsheathed swords and lathis but no confrontation with the police took place. Tear-gassing had not made any impact.
Suddenly the scene changed. The police decided that further progress of the procession had to be halted. Lathi charge was ordered and C.R-P.F. stationed on the lake side of the crossing was moved up. The crowd became unruly and some of the protesters picked up stones lying nearby and threw them at the police. Others wielded their kirpans and pushed the C.R.P.F. back from where they had started. Sensing more trouble armed police men inside the island opened fire. Simultaneously, the police at the first barricade also launched a vigorous lathi charge and chased protesters from the first barricade towards the second barricade. People between the first and the second barricade got trapped while those who were behind the first barricade ran back and were saved.
In the meantime the head of the procession had already reached the Vidhan Sabha. There was no police arrangement worth the name in the secretariat or Vidhan Sabha compound. The usual police on duty did not stop the procession. Initially there was a lot of confusion amongst them as to what they should do, having reached their destination, but soon the leaders asserted themselves and ordered everyone to sit down.
During this confusion one unfortunate incident did take place and we have carefully examined its time and manner. Mr Ohri, D.I.G (Deputy Inspector General) Security, Punjab who was sitting in his office in Vidhan Sabha, on learning of the arrival of the demonstrators in the compound was alarmed and rushed outside. He ordered closure of all doors and sent for reinforcements from the Secretariat. As he was taking these steps, some young men from the demonstrators came to him and said, “D.C.Sahib, they are killing our people. Please tell them to allow them to come here.” As Mr Ohri stalled for time waiting for re-enforcements to arrive, and repeatedly assured them that he would do whatever was possible, these boys got restless, caught hold of him from the arm and asked him to come with them in their jeep. The jeep didn’t start and in the meantime he was rescued by other policemen on duty who recognized him.
We have carefully examined whether this was the provocation for lathi charge or firing. The evidence on all sides is unanimous that this incident is subsequent to firing and is therefore not related in any manner with the police action.
CONCLUSION:
- The incident shows that there was serious lack of co-ordination between the Punjab Government and Chandigarh Administration. The two Governments seem to have acted in compartmentalized fashion even in situations which pose a common problem.
- The strategy of the Chandigarh police in making its last bid to stop the agitators at the second barricade while leaving the Vidhan Sabha is impractical and unimaginative. If the same force, in the same strength had been deployed at the Vidhan Sabha, the entire incident may have been averted.
You grant the democratic right to present a memorandum to your elected representatives on the one hand and take it away with the other. Once the right has been conceded on the assurance of peaceful protest, it cannot be robbed when the same is about to be exercised.
The police must devise a strategy which can balance the exercise of democratic rights and public safety. This could only have been done if the protesters had been allowed to reach the Assembly, and police force deployed in a manner which could take care of all possible dangers to public safety.
We find that it was lopsided planning of the Chandigarh police which may have prompted avoidable police action. In this regard we strongly feel that a sound convention should emerge in Chandigarh so that members of the public can assemble near the Assembly at a particular place where their leaders accept their memoranda. Such a convention already exists in Orissa where the public is allowed to go up to the Assembly gate and a Minister or Chief Minister comes to accept the same. Entire police arrangement is done only near the Assembly.
- We are unable to find any just reason which may have prompted the Police to change its prior decision to let the demonstrators go through after breaking the barrier and after one third of the procession had passed to alter the same, order lathi charge and firing. This only shows lack of unity of command, confusion in their minds, poor mob management and scant regard for democratic values or human lives.
All accounts show that there was no untoward incident till the order to enforce lathi charge was given. There was no change in the situation from the time when the protesters had broken through the barrier until the lathi charge.
Despite police action of lathi charge and firing those who reached the Assembly conducted themselves in an orderly manner. There was not a single case of attack on police men or civilians by any of the processionists who turned back and came to sector 17. To have apprehended danger at their hand in the event of their reaching the Assembly was an error of judgment on the part of managers of the police force.
- No warning to the crowd as required under section 129 of the C.R.P.C. was given before resorting to Lathi Charge or firing, nor any announcement to that effect was made on public announcement system.
We are aware that law & order is a ticklish problem and what steps would succeed in a particular situation is at best a matter of individual assessment made on the spur of the moment in the midst of surcharged atmosphere. Therefore, one has to give allowance for the fact that decision to use a certain force was taken in a situation where many amongst thousands were carrying unsheathed swords and police could have imagined that the worst might happen.
But the force that eventually came to be used was far in excess of the requirements of the situation. Even after the firing ceased C.R.P.F. continued to chase members of the crowd who were running back and beat them up mercilessly. This accounts for an exceptionally high number of injured (38) who bore lathi injuries. Two Sikh youths were killed in the indiscriminate firing by the security forces.
Regarding the alleged attack on the police by the crowd, it may be stated that only five policeman are found to have received medical attention (injury by blunt weapon) and the claim of Inspector General Police(I.G.P), Chandigarh given at the time of press briefing on 21st March, that of 15 policeman having received injuries, is found to be incorrect.
